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Key points
•	 After	a	period	of	reduced	significance	following	the	end	of	the	
Cold	War,	the	Norwegian	High	North	–	which	consists	of	the	
(mainly)	maritime	areas	in	the	Arctic	located	within	the	Nor-
wegian	borders	or	falling	under	Norwegian	jurisdiction	–	has	
recently	once	again	become	a	 strategically	 important	 region	
for	Oslo.	It	is	regarded	as	the	third	most	energy-rich	part	of	the	
country,	and	plays	a	significant	role	in	both	fishing	and	mari-
time	transport	via	the	emerging	Northern	Sea	Route.
•	 Due	to	 the	 importance	of	 the	Norwegian	High	North	for	 the	
Norway’s	economic	development	and	its	geopolitical	standing	
in	 the	world,	Oslo’s	 economic	 and	 foreign	policy	 is	 based	on	
ensuring	the	ability	to	both	maintain	access	to	and	utilise	the	
region’s	 natural	 resources.	 Consequently,	 any	 challenges	 or	
threats	to	the	broadly	defined	security	of	the	region	are	seen	
as	of	paramount	importance	for	Norway’s	defence	policy.
•	 Since	parts	of	 the	Norwegian	High	North	used	to	be,	or	still	
are,	subject	to	legal	disputes	–	mainly	with	Russia	–	the	region	
is	perceived	as	the	most	significant	source	of	challenges	and	
threats	to	Norway’s	soft	and	hard	security.
•	 In	order	to	successfully	deal	with	the	potential	challenges	and	
threats	 facing	 the	Norwegian	High	North,	Norway	has	 been	
pursuing	 a	 defence	 policy	 based	 on	 cooperation	 and	 deter-
rence.	Cooperation	means	establishing	contacts	and	improving	
collaboration	with	Russia	in	cross-border	relations,	in	the	pe-
troleum	sector	and	in	the	military	sphere.	The	deterrent	meas-
ures	 include	 maintaining	 NATO’s	 credibility	 as	 a	 collective	
defence	alliance	and	strengthening	its	presence	in	the	region;	
increasing	military	cooperation	with	the	United	States;	build-
ing	up	Norway’s	own	military	capabilities	for	potential	opera-
tions	in	the	north	of	the	country;	and	developing	political	and	
military	 cooperation	 across	 Northern	 Europe.	 The	 primary	
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objective	of	Oslo’s	defence	policy	is	to	minimise	the	likelihood	
of	crises	and	conflicts	emerging	in	the	High	North	which	could	
prove	too	‘big’	for	Norway	but	too	‘small’	for	NATO.
•	 The	policy	of	deterrence	currently	pursued	by	Norway,	how-
ever,	is	qualitatively	different	to	that	adopted	in	the	Cold	War	
era.	 Norway’s	 and	 NATO’s	military	 presence	 in	 the	 Norwe-
gian	High	North	is	envisaged	as	a	stabilising	factor	prevent-
ing	 any	potential	 crises.	 It	 is	 therefore	vital	 that	 it	 does	not	
provoke	a	reaction	from	Russia	and	does	not	undermine	the	
stability	and	security	of	the	High	North	by	setting	off	an	arms	
race.	Furth	ermore,	in	Norway’s	public	discourse	Russia	is	not	
explicitly	 portrayed	 as	 a	 threat.	 According	 to	 Oslo,	 overag-
gressive	 rhetoric	 could	 jeopardise	 cooperation	 between	 the	
two	countries.	Nonetheless,	the	lack	of	such	rhetoric	has	not	
stopped	Norway	from	adopting	coherent	and	consistent	deter-
rent	measures.
•	 Oslo’s	 focus	 on	 security	 issues	 in	 the	High	North	has	 intro-
duced	a	review	of	 its	military	engagement	abroad.	However,	
this	has	not	meant	a	withdrawal	from	overseas	operations	(by	
the	UN,	NATO,	the	‘coalition	of	the	willing’,	or	the	EU).	Norway	
continues	to	see	its	engagement	in	military	missions	abroad	as	
a	way	to	consolidate	its	own	position	within	NATO	and	in	its	
relations	with	its	allies.	But	its	decisions	to	take	part	in	inter-
national	operations	are	increasingly	contingent	on	the	follow-
ing	 factors:	 the	extent	 to	which	 they	could	 impact	Norway’s	
ability	to	defend	its	own	territory;	whether	or	not	the	missions	
have	received	a	UN	Security	Council	mandate;	and	the	poten-
tial	political	benefits	of	Norwegian	military	engagement.
•	 Norway	has	been	cautious	about	cooperating	with	 the	allies	
from	the	Baltic	Sea	region	with	regard	to	NATO’s	collective	de-
fence.	For	Oslo,	these	countries	are	competing	against	Norway	
in	attracting	the	attention,	security	guarantees	and	military	
presence	of	both	NATO	and	the	most	important	allies.	Norway	
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is	also	concerned	that	an	increase	in	tensions	in	the	Baltic	Sea	
region	 between	NATO	 and	 Russia	 could	 have	 a	 detrimental	
effect	 on	Norwegian-Russian	 relations.	 Similarly,	Oslo	 fears	
that	Norway’s	military	or	political	involvement	in	NATO’s	ac-
tivities	near	 the	Russian	border	–	which	Russia	 sees	as	hos-
tile	–	could	have	repercussions	for	the	High	North.	Despite	the	
rather	distanced	attitude	Oslo	has	adopted,	one	can	nonethe-
less	identify	potential	areas	for	cooperation.
•	 In	recent	years,	the	bilateral	dimension	of	relations	between	
Norway	and	Poland	has	created	greater	opportunities	for	col-
laboration.	The	most	promising	of	these	has	been	a	pragmatic	
military-technical	 co-operation	 that	may	 benefit	 the	 armed	
forces	and	the	defence	industries	of	both	countries,	but	which	
does	 not	 have	 a	 distinctive	 political	 character	 and	 will	 not	
cause	controversy	in	Norway’s	relations	with	Russia.
•	 Norway’s	defence	policy,	formulated	during	the	two	terms	of	
a	left-wing	government	led	by	Prime	Minister	Jens	Stoltenberg	
(2005-2013),	enjoys	cross-party	consensus	in	the	country.	It	is	
therefore	unlikely	that	the	new	coalition	government	formed	
by	 the	 Conservatives	 and	 the	 Progress	 Party	 (following	 the	
parliamentary	 elections	 in	 autumn	 2013)	will	 introduce	 any	
major	changes	to	the	existing	policy.	However,	if	changes	are	
made,	 the	 new	 government	 is	more	 likely	 to	 increase	mili-
tary	 spending	and	 to	 revise	 the	 reforms	of	 the	Armed	Forc-
es	 in	order	 to	boost	Norway’s	 operational	 capabilities	 in	 the	
High	North.	The	right-wing	coalition	government	could	also	
strengthen	 Norway’s	 ties	 with	 the	 United	 States	 and	 some-
what	increase	Norway’s	presence	in	NATO’s	operations.
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introduction
Norway	 is	 currently	 the	 only	Western	 European	 state	 and	 ‘old’	
NATO	member	that	strongly	relies	on	the	traditional	dimension	
of	NATO's	collective	defence.	It	is	also	the	only	ally	in	Western	Eu-
rope	which	perceives	Russia	as	a	threat	to	its	military	security,	in	
the	so-called	High	North.
It	is	therefore	worth	taking	a	closer	look	at	how	Norway’s	defence	
policy	 is	 being	 shaped,	 including	 the	 country’s	 activity	 within	
NATO	and	across	Northern	Europe,	as	well	as	its	policy	towards	
Russia.	This	paper	also	considers	the	possibilities	and	limitations	
of	political,	military	and	technical	cooperation	with	Norway.	For	
the	Baltic	Sea	countries,	Norway’s	defence	policy	may	be	an	inter-
esting	case	for	comparative	analysis,	and	a	source	of	inspiration	
for	the	development	of	national	defence	policies.
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i. norway’s defence policy  
and the high north1
Norway	 is	 currently	one	of	 the	world’s	wealthiest	 countries.	 Its	
prosperity	 is	 linked	 predominantly	 to	 the	 extraction	 of	 oil	 and	
natural	 gas	 from	 the	 Norwegian	 continental	 shelf,	 which	 first	
began	 in	 the	 1970s.	 The	 Norwegian	 petroleum	 sector	 gener-
ates	a	third	of	state	budget	revenue	and	accounts	for	more	than	
half	of	 the	country’s	exports.	Equally	 important	 for	 the	Norwe-
gian	economy	are	 the	fishing	 industry	and	maritime	 transport.	
Whether	or	not	the	current	economic	growth	can	be	maintained	
depends	largely	on	Norway’s	ability	to	retain	access	to	these	re-
sources,	as	well	as	on	managing	them	sustainably.	In	this	context,	
the norwegian high north – which consists of those (mainly) 
maritime areas in the arctic located within the norwegian 
borders or falling under norwegian jurisdiction2 – has in 
recent years once again3 become strategically important for 
oslo (see	Appendix	1).	As	the	Arctic	ice	cover	continues	to	shrink,	
and	new	technologies	are	developed,	the	High	North	is	becoming	
1	 The	 ‘High	 North’	 (Norwegian	 term	 for	 the	 Arctic)	 is	 defined	 as	 an	 area	
where	the	average	temperature	of	the	warmest	months	of	the	year	remains	
below	10˚C.	It	covers	the	areas	surrounding	the	North	Pole	and	the	adjacent	
seas,	together	with	a	number	of	islands	and	some	parts	of	the	mainland.
2	 The	Norwegian	High	North	covers:	the	Norwegian	territorial	sea	and	part	
of	Norway’s	northern	regions	(Nordland,	Troms	and	Finnmark);	Norway’s	
200-mile	 exclusive	 economic	 zone	 in	 the	Barents	 Sea	 and	 the	North	 Sea;	
a	disputed	part	of	the	continental	shelf	beyond	the	200	nautical	mile	limit	
in	several	specific	regions	of	the	Arctic;	the	Svalbard	archipelago,	and	Jan	
Mayen	island.
3	 The	High	North	played	an	important	role	for	Norway	and	NATO	throughout	
the	Cold	War,	during	which	time	there	was	a	need	to	maintain	a	strategic	
balance	between	the	major	powers	(the	US,	the	USSR)	in	the	North	Atlantic.	
In	the	1990s,	the	region	experienced	strategic	marginalisation	and	demili-
tarisation.	Security	issues	gradually	gave	way	to	environmental	concerns.	
Calls	were	made	for	the	prevention	of	potential	accidents	in	the	operation	of	
a	Russian	nuclear	power	plant,	the	disposal	of	radioactive	waste,	the	stor-
age	of	nuclear	weapons,	as	well	as	the	stationing	and	scrapping	of	nuclear	
submarines	on	the	Kola	Peninsula.	Due	to	geographical	proximity,	such	ac-
cidents	could	have	had	disastrous	consequences	for	the	northern	regions	of	
Norway.
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an	increasingly	attractive	area	for	prospecting	and	extraction	of	
oil	and	gas,	as	well	as	for	fishing	and	maritime	transport.	Conse-
quently,	Norway’s	economic	and	foreign	policy	is	to	a	large	extent	
determined	by	 the	 country’s	 ability	 to	maintain	 access	 to	 these	
resources	and	to	continue	to	exploit	them.	any challenges and 
risks that could in the future threaten the economic develop-
ment of norway’s high north are seen as being of paramount 
importance for norway’s defence policy. Since	parts	of	the	re-
gion	used	to	be,	or	still	are,	subject	to	legal	disputes	–	with	Mos-
cow	as	Oslo’s	main	adversary	–	Russia	is	seen	as	a	major	source	of	
challenges	and	threats	to	Norway’s	broadly	defined	security	and	
national	interests	in	the	region.
1. norway’s national interests 
To	understand	the	importance	of	the	High	North	for	Norway,	one	
needs	to	consider	the	region’s	significance	for	the	three	main	sec-
tors	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 economy:	 energy,	 fishing	 and	 maritime	
transport.
the third energy region4.	The	petroleum	sector	 (oil	and	natu-
ral	gas)	is	Norway’s	most	important	branch	of	industry5.	In	2012,	
it	created	23%	of	GDP	and	generated	30%	of	state	revenue.	In	ad-
dition,	the	sector’s	output	accounted	for	more	than	half	the	total	
value	of	Norwegian	exports.	According	to	the	currently	available	
data,	the	largest	remaining	and	undiscovered	reserves	of	Norwe-
gian	oil	and	natural	gas	are	located	in	the	North	Sea,	followed	by	
the	Norwegian	Sea	in	second	place,	and	the	Barents	Sea	in	third	
place.	However,	production	levels	in	many	of	the	North	Sea	fields	
have	already	peaked.	It	is	very	likely	that	large	deposits	of	natural	
4	 Source	 of	 data:	 The	 Norwegian	 Petroleum	 Directorate,	 ‘Facts	 2013	 –	 The	
Norwegian	petroleum	sector’,	March	2013,	pp.	19-29,	http://npd.no/Global/
Engelsk/3-Publications/Facts/Facts2013/FACTS_2013.pdf	
5	 In	2011,	Norway	was	the	world’s	7th	 largest	oil	exporter	and	14th	 largest	oil	
producer.	In	the	same	year,	Norway	was	the	world’s	3rd	biggest	natural	gas	
exporter	and	6th	biggest	natural	gas	producer.
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gas	and	oil	will	be	discovered	in	the	Barents	Sea	in	the	Norwegian	
High	North.	This	area	has	not	yet	been	explored	and	it	is	only	now	
being	gradually	opened	for	development.	Until	recently,	explora-
tion	and	extraction	was	permitted	only	in	the	southern	sections	
of	the	sea6.	In	the	first	half	of	2013,	Norway’s	government	agreed	to	
start	exploration	in	the	south-eastern	region	of	the	sea	–	an	area	
previously	affected	by	a	boundary	dispute	between	Norway	and	
Russia.	The	northern	part	 of	 the	Barents	Sea	 remains	 closed	 to	
extraction	activities.	Taking	into	account	the	expected	future	de-
cline	in	production	in	both	the	North	Sea	and	the	Norwegian	Sea,	
the Barents sea basin is seen by the norwegian petroleum in-
dustry as the third most important, and in the long term, as 
norway’s most promising energy region.
fish stocks7.	 Since	 the	 1990s,	 the	 value	 of	Norwegian	 fish	 and	
seafood	exports	(from	both	traditional	catches	and	fish	farming)	
rose	steadily,	to	reach	around	€7	billion	in	2010-2011,	or	about	6%	
of	Norway’s	total	exports.	In	2010,	Norway	was	the	world’s	second	
largest	exporter	of	fish	and	seafood	(based	on	the	value	of	the	ex-
ports),	selling	about	90%	of	its	production8.	However,	90%	of	the	
Norwegian	catch	comes	from	stocks	of	fish	also	harvested	by	oth-
er	countries,	primarily	Russia	in	the	Barents	Sea	and	EU	member	
states	in	the	North	Sea	and	the	Norwegian	Sea.	In	the	High	North,	
Norway	and	Russia	share	the	stocks	of	Atlantic	cod,	haddock	and	
capelin.	In	the	case	of	cod,	the	catches	allocated	for	export	come	
mostly	 from	 this	 stock.	 In	 2011	 capelin	 and	 cod	were	Norway’s	
6	 In	 the	case	of	 the	 so-called	Barents	Sea	South,	only	one	field	 is	 currently	
being	 developed	 (natural	 gas	 deposits	 on	 Snøhvit).	 In	 2013,	work	 is	 to	 be	
launched	at	another	field	(oil	and	natural	gas	deposits	on	Goliat),	followed	
by	the	develoment	of	the	Skrugard	and	Havis	fields	(oil	and	natural	gas)	in	
5-10	years’	time.
7	 Source:	Norwegian	Ministry	of	Fisheries	and	Coastal	Affairs,	Facts	about	
Fisheries	 and	Aquaculture	 2012,	 http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FKD/
Brosjyrer%20og%20veiledninger/2012/FKD_Fiskeri_Havbruk_2012_eng_
web.pdf	
8	 In	2010,	Norway	was	the	world’s	10th	biggest	fish	and	seafood	producer	(in-
cluding	catches	and	fish	farming).
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second	 and	 third	most	 harvested	 fish	 species	 respectively.	the 
Barents sea is therefore a vital area for the norwegian fish-
eries sector.
new maritime transport route.	Climate	change	and	the	result-
ant	melting	of	sea	ice	cover	in	the	Arctic	is	opening	up	new	oppor-
tunities	for	maritime	transport	in	the	High	North.	The	emerging	
Northern	Sea	Route	(also	known	as	the	Northeast	Passage)	would	
shorten	the	sea	route	from	Europe	to	Asia	(Rotterdam-Shanghai)	
by	about	5000	km,	cutting	journey	time	from	30	to	14	days	com-
pared	to	the	traditional	route	through	the	Suez	Canal.	The	route	
runs	mainly	along	the	Russian	coast,	but	on	the	approach	to	con-
tinental	Europe	it	also	flanks	the	coast	of	Norway.	Although	the	
Northern	Sea	Route	is	unlikely	to	become	a	serious	competitor	for	
the	traditional	route	in	the	next	two	decades,	it	may	nonetheless	
provide	a	viable	alternative,	particularly	in	the	summer	months.	
The	use	 of	 the	passage	 is	 currently	very	 limited,	mainly	due	 to	
difficult	navigation	conditions	associated	with	unpredictable	fast	
and	floating	ice	cover,	the	technical	requirements	for	vessels	op-
erating	in	such	conditions,	shallow	waters	on	parts	of	the	route,	as	
well	as	the	rather	slow	improvement	in	maritime	and	port	infra-
structure	and	insufficient	maritime	search	and	rescue	capabili-
ties9.	According	to	available	forecasts,	the	next	few	years	will	see	
a	gradual	increase	in	the	number	of	cargo	ships,	oil	tankers	and	
gas	carriers	using	the	route	(the	latter	two	due	to	an	expected	rise	
in	exploitation	of	resources	in	the	Arctic),	as	well	as	in	the	num-
ber	 of	 fishing	 vessels	 and	 cruise	 liners10.	norway is therefore 
9	 Harri	Mikkola,	Juha	Käpylä,	‘Arctic	Economic	Potential:	The	need	for	a	com-
prehensive	and	risk-aware	understanding	of	Arctic	dynamics’,	FIIA	Brief-
ing	Paper	127,	April	2013,	p.	6;	http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/337/	
10	 In	2012,	46	vessels,	jointly	carrying	1.2	million	tonnes,	sailed	the	whole	North-
ern	Sea	Route	from	Europe	to	Asia.	 In	2011,	 just	34	vessels	sailed	the	whole	
route,	shipping	820,000	tonnes,	while	in	2010,	only	4	ships	made	the	journey,	
carrying	just	111,000	tonnes	of	cargo.	See	Trude	Pettersen,	‘Preparing	for	re-
cord	season	on	the	Northern	Sea	Route’,	BarentsObserver, 6	June	2013,
	 http://barentsobserver.com/en/business/2013/06/preparing-record-sea-
son-northern-sea-route-06-06	
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currently preparing for a gradual rise in the volume of mari-
time traffic along its coast.
2. legal issues
Some	 of	 the	 areas	 in	 the	Norwegian	High	North	 used	 to	 be,	 or	
still	are,	subject	to	legal	disputes,	in	which	Norway	has	adopted	
a	markedly	different	position	to	that	taken	by	third	countries	–	es-
pecially	Russia.	These	areas	are	vital	for	the	fishing	industry,	and	
may	be	important	for	the	petroleum	sector	in	the	future.
Until	2010,	one	of	the	main	problems	in	Norwegian-Russian	rela-
tions	was	the	lack of delimitation of the maritime border be-
tween russia and norway	in	the	south-eastern	Barents	Sea	and	
the	Arctic	Ocean.	The	dispute,	which	dates	back	to	the	1970s,	cen-
tred	on	disagreements	over	the	delineation	of	exclusive	economic	
zones11	 and	on	 the	division	of	 the	continental	 shelf	between	 the	
two	countries12.	The	dispute	was	finally	settled	in	2010	when	the	
two	governments	signed	an	agreement	on	maritime	delimitation	
and	cooperation,	which	they	ratified	the	following	year.	The	doc-
ument	divided	the	disputed	area	into	two	approximately	equally	
sized	parts,	and	set	out	cooperation	procedures	in	the	exploration	
of	the	as	yet	undiscovered	oil	and	natural	gas	deposits	that	poten-
tially	extend	across	the	Norwegian-Russian	border.	As	a	result	of	
the	agreement,	one	of	the	possible	sources	of	Norwegian-Russian	
tension,	over	the	extraction	of	fossil	fuels	or	fishing	in	the	High	
North,	has	thus	been	removed.
11	 Within	their	200-mile	exclusive	economic	zone	a	state	has	sovereign	rights	to	
explore,	exploit,	protect	and	manage	natural	resources	(living	and	mineral),	
and	 the	 jurisdiction	over	 the	establishment	and	 the	utilisation	of	artificial	
islands,	 installations	 and	 equipment,	maritime	 scientific	 research	 and	 the	
protection	of	 the	maritime	 environment.	 See	Remigiusz	Bierzanek,	 Janusz	
Symonides,	Prawo	Międzynarodowe	Publiczne,	Warsaw	2005,	p.	226.
12	 According	to	the	1982	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(UN-
CLOS),	exploitation	rights	over	the	continental	shelf	may	extend	beyond	the	
standard	200	nautical	miles	limit	(i.e.	beyond	the	economic	zone)	if	the	con-
tinental	shelf	extends	beyond	that	limit.
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In	2006,	Norway	filed a claim to parts of the continental shelf	
which	extend	beyond	200	nautical	miles	out	from	its	coastal	base-
line	in the high north13.	Oslo	submitted	the	relevant	documents	
to	the	Commission	on	the	Limits	of	the	Continental	Shelf,	which	
issued	 its	 recommendations	 in	 2009.	 Although	 the	 2006	 appli-
cation	did	not	 rule	out	additional	 claims	 in	 the	 future,	 it	 seems	
that	 the	 issue	of	Norway’s	access	 to	 the	Arctic	continental	 shelf	
beyond	 the	 200	 nautical	mile	 limit	 has	 been	 largely	 resolved	 –	
at	 least	with	regard	to	Norwegian-Russian	relations	–	thanks	to	
the	maritime	delimitation	agreement	signed	in	2010.	However,	it	
should	be	noted	that	other	Arctic	countries,	namely	Russia,	Can-
ada,	Denmark	and	the	United	States,	have	also	laid	claims	to	the	
Arctic	 continental	 shelf	 beyond	 the	 standard	 200	nautical	mile	
limit,	and	are	either	planning	to,	or	have	already	submitted	the	
necessary	documents	to	the	Commission.	In	addition,	all	of	them	
have	been	trying	to	bolster	their	claims,	for	example	by	develop-
ing	 their	military	 capabilities	 and	 infrastructure	 in	 the	 Arctic	
region.	Nonetheless,	 in	 2008	all	five	 states	 adopted	 the	 Ilulissat	
Declaration	which	states	 that	any	disputes	 in	 the	Arctic	will	be	
resolved	within	the	existing	framework	of	international	law,	and	
without	resorting	to	unilateral	actions.
As	regards	the	High	North	region,	the	most	problematic	issue	for	
Norway,	and	for	its	relations	with	Russia,	is	the	question	of	the	le-
gal regime of the maritime areas and of the continental shelf 
around the svalbard archipelago.	Since	the	signing	of	the	Sval-
bard	Treaty	in	1920,	the	islands	have	been	under	Norwegian	sov-
ereignty	but	subject	to	certain	restrictions14.	The	ongoing	dispute	
13	 To	the	so-called	Loop	Hole	in	the	Barents	Sea,	the	Banana	Hole	in	the	Nor-
wegian	Sea,	and	to	the	Western	Nansen	Basin	in	the	Arctic	Ocean.
14	 All	signatories	to	the	treaty	have	equal	rights	of	access	to	the	archipelago,	in-
cluding	the	extraction	of	minerals,	hunting,	fishing	and	scientific	research.	
For	the	purpose	of	environment	protection,	Norway	is	permitted	to	regulate	
such	activity,	but	only	by	requiring	all	parties	to	comply	with	Norwegian	
environmental	policies.	It	has	no	right	to	impose	taxes	on	economic	activity	
on	Svalbard	beyond	what	is	necessary	to	cover	the	archipelago’s	adminis-
trative	costs.	The	Treaty	also	prohibits	the	construction	and	maintenance	
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centres	around	the	interpretation	of	the	Treaty	in	relation	to	the	
maritime	areas	and	the	continental	shelf	around	the	archipelago.	
Norway	 interprets	 the	Treaty	 literally,	 and	believes	 that	 equal	
right	of	access	to	Svalbard	(mainly,	the	principle	of	non-discrim-
ination	 in	 granting	 access	 to	natural	 resources,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
taxes	with	 the	 exception	of	 administrative	 fees)	 applies	 only	 to	
land	 territory	and	 the	 territorial	 sea,	 in	 line	with	 international	
law	as	understood	in	1920.	Oslo	believes	that	the	maritime	areas	
and	the	continental	shelf	beyond	the	12-mile	territorial	sea	limit	
remain	 subject	 to	Norway’s	 jurisdiction	and	 sovereignty	 rights.	
On	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 interpretation,	 in	 1977	Norway	 established	
a	200-mile	fisheries	protection	zone	around	Svalbard.	However,	
some	signatories	to	the	Treaty,	including	Russia15,	have	focused	on	
the	document’s	intended	meaning,	and	believe	that	its	provisions	
also	apply	to	the	200-mile	maritime	area	surrounding	the	archi-
pelago.	According	to	this	 interpretation,	Svalbard	ought	to	have	
a	200-mile	economic	zone	envisaged	in	the	today’s	international	
law	of	the	sea,	which	would	be	available	to	all	Treaty	signatories	
on	equal	terms.	Therefore	these	signatories	do	not	recognise	Nor-
way’s	position	on	this	issue,	and	Oslo’s	decision	to	establish	a	fish-
eries	protection	zone	around	the	archipelago	is	seen	by	them	as	
unilateral	and	illegal.
3. challenges and threats
Due	to	the	importance	of	the	High	North	for	Norway’s	economic	
development	 and	 for	 its	 geopolitical	 standing	 in	 the	world,	 any	
challenges	and	threats	to	the	broadly	defined	security	of	the	re-
gion,	or	to	Norway’s	national	interests,	are	seen	as	of	paramount	
of	naval	bases	and	military	infrastructure	on	the	archipelago,	and	prohibits	
the	use	of	Svalbard	for	war-like	purposes.
15	 Also	Iceland,	Spain	and	the	United	Kingdom.	Throughout	the	Cold	War,	the	
heightened	geopolitical	importance	of	the	High	North	for	NATO	meant	that	
Norway’s	allies	were	more	likely	to	accept,	or	at	least	refrain	from	under-
mining,	Oslo’s	interpretation	of	international	law.
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importance	for	the	country’s	defence	policy.	Russia	is	widely	per-
ceived	as	their	primary	source.
In	relation	to	soft security,	the	challenges	and	threats	are	linked	
to	 the	 negative	 consequences	 of	 the	 exploitation	 of	 natural	 re-
sources	and	of	an	increased	volume	of	maritime	transport	in	the	
High	North.	This	applies	equally	to	industrial	accidents	that	could	
threaten	the	Arctic	ecosystem	(such	as	spills	of	natural	gas	or	oil	
from	offshore	rigs,	oil	 tankers	or	gas	carriers)	as	well	as	 to	any	
accidents	posing	a	danger	to	human	life	and	health	(including	ac-
cidents	on	oil	rigs,	as	well	as	collisions	and	damage	to	vessels	sail-
ing	in	the	Arctic	seas).	As	a	country	that	seeks	to	exercise	its	ju-
risdiction	and	sovereignty	rights	in	the	region,	and	which	aspires	
to	play	a	significant	role	in	the	Arctic,	Norway	needs	to	constantly	
monitor	and	patrol	the	maritime	areas	in	question,	and	provide	
effective	maritime	search	and	rescue	capabilities16.	It	is	therefore	
clear	that	these	‘soft’	challenges	have	a	noticeable	impact	on	the	
development	of	the	military	capabilities	of	the	Norwegian	Armed	
Forces.
Furthermore,	Norway	is	equally	conscious	of	the	challenges	and	
threats	that	fall	into	the	hard security category.	These	are	main-
ly	linked	to	the	highly	controversial	legal	regime	of	the	maritime	
areas	and	the	continental	shelf	around	the	Svalbard	archipelago.	
First,	there	are	concerns	over	fishing	within	Norway's	200-mile	
fisheries	protection	zone	around	Svalbard,	as	the	zone	is	not	rec-
ognised	 by	 Russia,	 among	 others.	 In	 recent	 years,	 the	 Norwe-
gian	Coast	Guard	has	‘arrested’	several	Russian	trawlers	which	it	
claimed	were	fishing	illegally	inside	the	conservation	zone17,	with	
16	 Jonas	Gahr	Støre,	‘The	High	North	and	the	Arctic:	The	Norwegian	Perspec-
tive’,	 The Arctic Herald,	 2/2012,	 15	 June	 2012,	 http://www.regjeringen.no/
nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/jgs_taler_artikler/2012/nord_arktis.
html?id=685072
17	 The	Norwegian	Coast	Guard,	or	Kystvakten,	 is	part	of	 the	Royal	Norwegian	
Navy,	and	 is	 therefore	subordinate	 to	 the	Ministry	of	Defence.	 Its	primary	
mission	is	to	monitor	the	fisheries	within	the	Norwegian	economic	zone	and	
inside	the	fisheries	protection	zone	around	Svalbard.	On	one	occasion	in	2005,	
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each	incident	triggering	a	strong	response	from	Russia.	Norway	is	
particularly	concerned	about	the	possibility	that	Russian	trawlers	
fishing	illegally	inside	the	conservation	zone	could	receive	protec-
tion	from	Russian	Navy	ships	accidentally	or	intentionally	located	
nearby.	In	such	a	case,	would	Norway	decide	to	ignore	this	chal-
lenge	to	its	jurisdiction	over	the	maritime	area	surrounding	Sval-
bard,	or	would	the	Norwegian	Coast	Guard	choose	to	respond,	and	
if	so,	what	would	be	the	consequences	of	such	action?	In	addition,	
any	potential	exacerbation	of	disputes	over	the	interpretation	of	
the	 legal	 regime	 around	 Svalbard	 could	 also	 spark	 a	 boycott	 of	
the	bilateral	regulation	of	fisheries	 in	the	High	North18.	Second,	
potential	 problems	 could	 arise	 from	 the	 exploitation	 of	 natural	
resources	 on	 the	 continental	 shelf	 around	Svalbard.	 So	 far,	 the	
area	has	remained	unexplored	by	Norway	(or	any	other	country).	
However,	if	significant	deposits	were	to	be	discovered	in	the	area,	
the	signatories	to	the	Svalbard	Treaty	(mainly	Russia,	according	
to	Norway)	could	demand	non-discriminatory	access	to	explora-
tion	and	production	opportunities,	and	they	could	insist	on	pay-
ing	the	very	low	Svalbard	tax	rate	rather	than	the	much	higher	
Norwegian	 tariffs19.	 As	 a	 result,	Norway	 remains	 apprehensive	
about	Russia's	actions	and	about	 the	prospect	of	being	 forced	 to	
defend	its	sovereign	rights	over	the	continental	shelf	around	Sval-
bard.	One	possible	scenario	might	be	the	following:	What	would	
happen	 if	 a	Russian	 company,	 citing	 the	Russian	 interpretation	
of	the	treaty,	began	exploration	and	production	work	inside	the	
after	Norwegian	inspectors	boarded	a	Russian	fishing	boat,	the	boat’s	captain	
decided	to	head	back	to	a	Russian	port,	with	the	inspectors	still	onboard.	
18	 In	 the	Barents	Sea,	Norway	has	 collaborated	with	Russia	 since	 the	 1970s;	
every	 year	 the	 countries	 set	 fishing	 quotas	 and	 agree	 on	 the	 division	 of	
catches	 of	 individual	 species	 of	 fish.	 It	 is	 therefore	 unlikely	 that	 this	 co-
operation	would	be	discontinued	as	a	result	of	incidents	involving	Russian	
trawlers.	 Throughout	 the	Cold	War	 period,	 despite	 strained	 relations	 be-
tween	East	and	West,	fisheries	regulations	were	effectively	negotiated.
19	 Brit	 Fløistad,	 ‘Controversy	 over	 the	 Legal	 Regime	 outside	 Svalbard’s	 Ter-
ritorial	Waters’,	DNAK	Security	Brief	6-2008,	FOCUS	NORTH	6-2008,	The	
Norwegian	 Atlantic	 Committee.	 http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/
files/atlanterhavskomiteen.no/Documents/Publikasjoner/Fokus%20Nord/
FN%206-2008.pdf	
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200-mile	zone	surrounding	the	archipelago,	and	then	the	Russian	
government	decided	to	become	involved	in	the	dispute?
russia is the most important actor in the potential crisis sce-
narios anticipated by norway in the high north, both in rela-
tion to soft security (due to russia’s relatively poor and com-
monly disregarded health and safety standards) as well as 
in relation to hard security issues.	The	perception	of	Russia	as	
a	 potential	 aggressor	 has	 become	 particularly	 widespread	 since	
2007-2008.	Several	factors	precipitated	this	shift.	 In	2007,	Russia	
resumed	flights	of	 its	strategic	bombers	near	 the	Norwegian	air-
space.	In	the	same	year,	a	Russian	expedition	planted	a	Russian	flag	
on	the	North	Pole	seabed,	which	clearly	demonstrated	the	scope	of	
Russia’s	ambitions	and	claims.	 In	addition,	 the	Russian-Georgian	
war	in	2008	made	Norway	realise	that	Russia	would	be	willing	to	
use	force	in	order	to	protect	its	national	interests	and	spheres	of	in-
fluence	in	its	neighbourhood.	Equally	worrying	has	been	the	mod-
ernisation	and	reform	of	the	Russian	Armed	Forces	and	their	 in-
tensive	(and	offensive)	military	exercises.	As	a	result,	Norway	has	
begun	to	focus	its	attention	on	the	High	North,	fearing:
•	 Moscow	 testing	Norway’s	 determination	 to	 defend	 its	 juris-
diction	and	sovereign	rights	in	the	High	North,	especially	in	
the	areas	around	Svalbard;
•	 Russia’s	 attempts	 to	 undermine	 the	 Norwegian	 interpreta-
tion	of	the	jurisdiction	and	sovereign	rights	around	Svalbard,	
which	 could	 either	 accidentally	 or	 deliberately	 escalate	 to	
a	military	crisis;
•	 pressure	from	Moscow	–	including	a	threat	of	military	action	
–	to	coerce	Norway	into	taking	particular	decisions	or	actions	
in	the	High	North;
•	 Russia’s	possible	decision	to	test	NATO’s	reaction	and	willing-
ness	to	support	its	member	states	(including	Norway)	through	
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political	and	military	action	in	response	to	various	crisis	situ-
ations,	including	those	that	do	not	necessarily	meet	the	crite-
ria	set	out	in	Article	5	of	the	Washington	Treaty.
Consequently,	a	crisis	in	Norwegian-Russian	relations	could	not	
be	ruled	out	under	the	following	circumstances:	if	large	and	eas-
ily	accessible	deposits	of	natural	resources	are	discovered	inside	
the	200-mile	zone	around	Svalbard;	if	Russia	wanted	to	demon-
strate	its	superpower	ambitions	in	response	to	a	worsening	situa-
tion	in	the	international	arena	or	in	response	to	possible	conflicts	
with	 the	West	 in	other	regions;	 if	Moscow	wanted	 to	divert	 the	
attention	of	the	Russian	society	from	internal	problems	caused	by	
political,	 social	 or	 economic	 instability	 in	Russia;	 and	finally,	 if	
Norway	made	changes	to	its	security,	defence	or	economic	policy	
that	could	have	a	significant	negative	impact	on	Russia’s	national	
interests.	nonetheless, norway is not concerned about a pos-
sible cold war-style invasion by russia, but rather about 
limited and focused military attacks, which in combination 
with non-military instruments (such as cyber-attacks, ter-
rorist attacks, disinformation campaigns) could help russia 
achieve specific political and economic goals.
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ii. norway’s defence policy:  
cooperation and deterrence
in order to successfully deal with the potential challenges and 
threats in the norwegian high north, oslo has been pursuing 
a defence policy based on cooperation and deterrence.	 Its	 co-
operation	policy	focuses	on	increasing	contacts	&	cooperation	and	
building	trust	with	Russia,	both	in	bilateral	relations	and	within	
the	wider	community	of	Arctic	states.	Oslo’s	deterrence	policy,	on	
the	other	hand,	aims	to	achieve	the	following	goals:	to	strengthen	
the	credibility	of	NATO	as	a	collective	defence	alliance;	to	increase	
military	cooperation	with	the	United	States;	to	build	up	Norway’s	
own	 defence	 capabilities;	 and	 to	 develop	 political	 and	 military	
co-operation	across	Northern	Europe.	the primary objective of 
norwegian defence policy is to minimise the likelihood of cri-
ses and conflicts in the high north that could prove too ‘big’ for 
norway but too ‘small’ for nato20.	In	the	event	of	a	‘small’	crisis,	
a	country	like	Norway	–	with	relatively	weak	military	capabilities,	
a	controversial	interpretation	of	the	legal	regime	around	Svalbard,	
and	which	has	uncertainties	about	NATO's	potential	 response21	 –	
could	find	itself	on	the	losing	side	of	the	crisis.	however, the poli-
cy of deterrence currently pursued by norway is qualitatively 
different to that adopted in the cold war era. norway’s and 
nato’s military presence in the norwegian high north is en-
visaged as a stabilising factor, preventing any potential crises. 
oslo wants to avoid russian counteractions and does not wish 
to undermine the stability and security of the high north by 
setting off an arms race22.
20	 Gen.	Sverre	Diesen,	Norway’s	Chief	of	Defence	(2005-2009),	in	an	interview	
with	ANB-NTB,	‘Vil	ha	proffer	forsvar’,	24	June	2013,	http://www.an.no/ny-
heter/article6727944.ece			
21	 Due	to	the	controversies	mentioned	earlier	and	the	nature	of	potential	ac-
tions	that	could	be	interpreted	differently	with	regard	to	the	application	of	
Art.	5	of	the	Washington	Treaty.
22	 Sven	C.	Holtsmark,	‘Towards	cooperation	or	confrontation?	Security	in	the	
High	North’,	Research	Paper	No.	45,	NATO	Defense	College,	February	2009,	
p.	11,	http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1		
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The	 principles	 underpinning	 the	 current	 defence	 policy	 have	
cross-party	consensus	in	Norway,	and	the	outcomes	of	the	policy	
have	generally	been	positively	received.	Consequently,	the	coali-
tion	government	 formed	by	 the	Conservatives	and	 the	Progress	
Party	 after	 the	parliamentary	 elections	held	 in	 September	 2013	
is	 unlikely	 to	 introduce	major	 changes	 to	 the	 policy.	 A	 shift	 in	
policy	is	also	unlikely	as	last	year	the	Norwegian	Parliament	ap-
proved	 the	 Long-Term	 Defence	 Plan	 2013-2016	 prepared	 by	 the	
Norwegian	Ministry	of	Defence,	which	defines	the	priorities	for	
Norway’s	defence	policy	and	the	future	direction	of	Armed	Forces	
reform.	Having	said	that,	the	more	powerful	member	of	the	coali-
tion,	the	Conservative	Party,	appears	to	be	paying	more	attention	
to	defence	matters	 than	 the	previous	 social	democratic	govern-
ment	headed	by	Jens	Stoltenberg.	Therefore,	if	changes	are	made,	
we	may	expect	a	coalition	government	 led	by	the	Conservatives	
to	choose	to	increase	defence	spending	and	potentially	introduce	
a	revision	of	 the	Armed	Forces	reform	to	boost	Norway’s	opera-
tional	capabilities	in	the	High	North.	As	regards	the	international	
dimension	 of	 the	 policy,	 the	 coalition	 government	may	 seek	 to	
strengthen	Norway’s	 ties	with	 the	United	States	 and	 somewhat	
increase	Norway’s	presence	in	NATO’s	operations23.
1. cooperation with russia
given the fact that the key objective of norway’s defence pol-
icy is to avert potential crises or conflicts in the high north, 
oslo’s cooperation with russia in the arctic aims to minimise 
this risk and to build a network of contacts and enhance mu-
tual trust.	In	its	bilateral	relations	with	Moscow,	Norway	seeks	
to	ensure	a	consensual	resolution	of	any	disputes	that	could	oth-
erwise	lead	to	a	military	crisis.	One	example	of	this	policy	was	the	
signing	(in	2010)	and	ratification	(in	2011)	of	a	bilateral	agreement	
23	 ‘Politisk	 platform	 for	 en	 regering	 utgått	 av	Høyre	 og	 Fremskrittspartiet’,	
10	 July	2013,	pp.	 39-40,	http://www.hoyre.no/filestore/Filer/Politikkdoku-
menter/plattform.pdf		
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on	 the	 delimitation	 of	 the	 maritime	 border	 and	 cooperation,	
which	included	a	bilateral	framework	for	regulating	fisheries	in	
the	Barents	Sea.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	establishment	of	a	net-
work	of	contacts	in	the	region	is	seen	as	a	mechanism	for	averting	
the	escalation	of	potential	crises	through	the	use	of	existing	com-
munication	channels.	It	aims	also	to	help	create	a	positive	image	
of	the	other	partner.	Norway’s	actions	here	are	being	carried	out	
in	three	areas:	social,	economic,	and	military.
Oslo	seeks	to	intensify	cross-border contacts between	Norway	and	
Russia	in	order	to	increase	mutual	trust	and	develop	cooperation	
between	the	Norwegian	and	the	Russian	regions	of	the	High	North.	
These	measures	focus	on	the	cultural,	economic	and	social	spheres.	
In	2010,	the	High	North	was	the	first	region	in	the	Schengen	Area	
to	adopt	a	local	border	traffic	regime	which	enables	visa-free	travel	
across	the	Norwegian-Russian	border24	(Norway	is	a	member	of	the	
Schengen	Area	but	not	a	member	of	 the	EU).	The	countries	have	
also	introduced	visa	facilitation	procedures	for	their	citizens	from	
other	regions.	in the petroleum sector,	Norway	sees	 its	techno-
logical	know-how	and	its	experience	in	offshore	projects	as	a	form	
not	just	of	economic	but	also	political	capital.	Since	2012,	Norway	
has	been	engaged	in	developing	collaborative	projects	with	Russian	
corporations	in	the	exploration	and	extraction	of	fossil	fuels	in	both	
the	Russian	and	the	Norwegian	sections	of	the	continental	shelf25.	
24	 At	 the	 Norwegian-Russian	 border	 crossing	 in	 Storskog/Borisglebsk.	 See	
Thomas	Nilsen,	‘First	opening	in	the	Schengen-regime	with	Russia’,	Barents­
Observer,	 11	 February	 2010,	 http://barentsobserver.com/en/first-opening-
schengen-regime-russia	
25	 In	May	2012,	Rosneft	signed	a	cooperation	agreement	with	Norway’s	Statoil	
(whose	majority	shareholder	 is	 the	Norwegian	government)	under	which	
Statoil	received	a	33.4%	stake	in	several	fields	in	the	Russian	section	of	the	
Barents	Sea	 and	 in	 the	Sea	of	Okhotsk.	On	 the	basis	 of	 this	deal,	Rosneft	
received	 a	 20%	participating	 interest	 in	 a	 licence	 for	 the	 exploration	 and	
development	of	deposits	in	the	Norwegian	part	of	the	Barents	Sea	in	May	
2013.	In	addition,	Russia’s	LUKoil	was	awarded	participating	shares	in	two	
licenses.	 See	 Thomas	Nilsen,	 ‘Statoil,	 Rosneft	 sign	 landmark	Barents	 Sea	
deal’,	BarentsObserver,	5	May	2012,	http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/
statoil-rosneft-sign-landmark-barents-sea-deal
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Norway	would	like	these	projects	to	become	sufficiently	profitable	
(also)	 for	Russia	 to	make	any	potential	crises	–	and	the	resultant	
collapse	in	energy	cooperation	–	too	costly	for	Moscow.	in the mili-
tary sphere,	Norway	has	been	seeking	to	build	new	channels	of	
communication,	both	at	the	political	level	(between	the	Ministries	
of	Defence	and	the	Armed	Forces)	as	well	as	the	operational	level	
(between	the	armed	forces’	units	stationed	or	operating	in	the	High	
North).	It	is	hoped	that	this	would	enable	better	communication	at	
both	levels	 in	the	event	of	a	crisis,	so	as	to	avoid	misunderstand-
ings	that	could	escalate	into	military	conflict.	Since	2011,	Norway	
has	been	intensifying	military	contacts	between	the	two	countries’	
MoD	heads	and	armed	forces	commanders-in-chief26.	In	addition,	
since	2010	Norway	and	Russia	have	held	the	annual	POMOR	mili-
tary	exercises,	attended	mainly	by	the	countries’	navies	(but	also	
by	 their	 air	 forces)	 to	 improve	 communication	 and	 procedures,	
amongst	other	things,	and	to	practice	maritime	search	and	rescue	
operations27.
from norway’s point of view, co-operation with other actors 
in the arctic is equally important	–	within	the	frameworks	of	
the	so-called	Arctic	Five	(Norway,	Denmark/Greenland,	Canada,	
Russia	and	the	United	States)	or	the	Arctic	Council	(additionally	
involving	Sweden,	Finland	and	Iceland).	That	is	because	the	sta-
bility	 and	 security	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 High	 North	 is	 intimately	
26	 In	October	2011,	General	Harald	Sunde	became	the	first	Chief	of	Defence	of	
the	Norwegian	Armed	 Forces	 to	 visit	 Russia.	 In	 February	 2013,	Norway’s	
Defence	Minister	Anne-Grete	Strøm-Erichsen	made	a	visit	to	Russia	–	the	
first	such	visit	 in	 10	years.	Russia’s	Deputy	Defence	Minister	Anatoly	An-
tonov	visited	Norway	in	March	2012.	See	Trude	Pettersen,	‘Closer	military	
cooperation	between	Norway	and	Russia’,	BarentsObserver,	14	February	2013,	
http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2013/02/closer-military-coopera-
tion-between-norway-and-russia-14-02
27	 The	POMOR	drills	took	place	for	the	first	time	in	1994,	and	next	in	2010.	In	
addition,	Norwegian	and	Russian	units	are	conducting	the	BARENTS	mari-
time	search	and	rescue	and	oil	spill	emergency	exercises.	Trude	Peterssen,	
‘Norwegian-Russian	POMOR-2013	naval	exercise	starts	this	week’,	Barents­
Observer,	7	May	2013,	http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2013/05/nor-
wegian-russian-pomor-2013-naval-exercise-starts-week-07-05
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tied	up	with	the	stability	and	security	of	the	entire	Arctic	region.	
The	aim	of	 the	collaboration	 in	 the	Arctic	 is	 therefore	 to	estab-
lish	governance	mechanisms	 that	will	 reduce	 the	 temptation	of	
political	rivalry	outside	the	cooperation	frameworks,	or	of	violat-
ing	international	law,	and	which	will	thus	prevent	the	militarisa-
tion	of	the	region28.	In	2008,	the	Arctic	Five	adopted	the	Ilulissat	
Declaration	on	the	regulation	of	disputes	in	the	Arctic	under	in-
ternational	law.	In	2011,	the	member	states	of	the	Arctic	Council	
signed	the	Arctic	Search	and	Rescue	Agreement,	followed	by	the	
Agreement	on	Cooperation	on	Marine	Oil	Pollution	Preparedness	
and	Response	in	the	Arctic	in	2013.	In	June	2013,	the	defence	chiefs	
of	the	Arctic	Council	member	states	decided	to	increase	military	
cooperation	 in	 the	monitoring	 of	maritime	 areas	 and	 agreed	 to	
hold	joint	military	exercises29.	In	addition,	military	drills	involv-
ing	Russia	are	also	conducted	in	multilateral	formats	(such	as	the	
joint	US,	Norwegian	and	Russian	Northern	Eagle	exercise).
importantly, russia is not explicitly portrayed as a threat 
in norway’s public discourse.	Politicians,	military	leaders,	and	
experts	prefer	to	talk	about	maintaining	territorial	integrity	and	
sovereignty	in	the	High	North,	and	about	the	need	for	capabilities	
to	enforce	Norway’s	jurisdiction	and	sovereignty	rights.	In	public	
discourse,	 the	 reform	and	modernisation	of	 the	Russian	Armed	
Forces,	as	well	as	the	resumption	of	strategic	bomber	flights	and	of	
military	exercises	in	the	High	North,	are	all	frequently	described	
as	a	“return	to	normalcy”	similar	to	the	state	of	affairs	before	the	
collapse	of	 the	Russian	Armed	Forces	 in	 the	 1990s.	At	 the	 same	
time,	Norway	 is	 aware	of	 the	 consequences	 for	 its	 own	defence	
policy	of	the	changing	situation	in	the	High	North.	However	it	be-
lieves	that	overly aggressive rhetoric could threaten coopera-
tion between the two countries. nonetheless, the lack of such 
28	 Olaf	 Osica,	 ‘The	 High	 North	 as	 a	 New	 Area	 of	 Cooperation	 and	 Rivalry’,	
Nowa	Europa.	Przegląd	Natoliński,	No.	I	(4)	/	2010,	p.	13.
29	 Gerard	O’Dwyer,	‘Arctic	nations	set	cooperation	guidelines’,	DefenseNews,	27	June	
2013,	 http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130627/DEFREG01/306270013/Arc-
tic-Nations-Set-Cooperation-Guidelines
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rhetoric has not stopped norway from adopting coherent and 
consistent deterrent measures.
2. strengthening nato’s collective defence 
Since	 2008,	Norway	 has	 taken	 steps	 to	 strengthen	NATO’s	 sta-
tus	as	a	collective	defence	alliance,	and	it	has	been	committed	to	
increasing	 NATO’s	 presence	 in	 the	 Norwegian	High	 North.	 Al-
though	Oslo	has	not	withdrawn	from	overseas	operations,	it	has	
nonetheless	rebalanced	its	 involvement	 in	such	missions.	 In	ad-
dition,	strengthening	its	relations	with	the	United	States	is	being	
seen	by	Norway	as	a	top	priority.	At	the	same	time,	Norway’s	at-
tempts	to	increase	NATO’s	presence	in	the	Norwegian	High	North	
and	to	develop	closer	ties	with	the	United	States,	come	with	a	set	
of	limitations.
norway has been calling for the strengthening of nato’s col-
lective defence.	It	would	like	to	see	a	better	balance	between	the	
development	of	NATO’s	capabilities	for	collective	defence	on	the	
one	 hand,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 NATO’s	 capabilities	 for	 cri-
sis	management	 operations	 on	 the	 other.	According	 to	Norway,	
it	 is	necessary	to	rebalance	NATO’s	activities	due	to	the	current	
overemphasis	of	NATO	member	 states	and	NATO	structures	on	
developing	 capabilities	 for	 overseas	 operations.	 Over	 the	 past	
ten	years,	NATO	member	states	have	been	very	actively	involved	
in	a	number	of	 such	missions.	Consequently,	 strengthening	 the	
credibility	of	NATO	as	a	collective	defence	alliance	has	been	iden-
tified	as	the	top	priority	for	Norway’s	security	and	defence	policy,	
as	presented	in	the	Long-Term	Defence	Plan	2013-2016	formulated	
by	 the	Norwegian	Ministry	of	Defence30.	According	 to	Oslo,	 the	
30	 In	second	place	came	the	need	to	improve	Norway’s	own	defence	capabili-
ties;	the	need	for	regional	cooperation,	 in	third	place;	and	involvement	in	
overseas	operations	in	 last	place.	Norwegian	Ministry	of	Defence,	 ‘Et	for-
svar	for	vår	tid,	Proposisjon	til	Stortinget’,	Prop.	73	S,	p.	13,	23	March	2012,	
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37583840/PDFS/PRP201120120073000D-
DDPDFS.pdf	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
1/
20
14
26
measures	 refocusing	 on	NATO’s	 collective	 defence	 should	 cover	
three	areas:	surveillance, intelligence and deterrence.	Deter-
rence	 refers	 here	 to	 the	 maintenance	 of	 updated	 and	 credible	
contingency	 plans,	 supported	 with	 adequate	 presence	 of	 both	
Norwegian	 (military	 bases,	 exercises)	 and	 allied	 armed	 forces	
(exercises).	 Meanwhile,	 surveillance	 and	 intelligence	 should	
provide	NATO	with	adequate	situational	awareness	 in	 the	High	
North.	This	starts	with	the	analysis	of	regional	trends	in		security	
and	defence	as	well	as	in	related	areas	(such	as	the	petroleum	sec-
tor	and	maritime	transport),	and	ends	with	real-time	monitoring	
of	civilian	and	military	activities	in	the	region.	These	are	also	the	
key	capabilities	necessary	for	any	military	action,	in	the	event	the	
policy	 of	 deterrence	 proves	 insufficient31.	 The	 strengthening	 of	
NATO's	surveillance,	intelligence	and	deterrence	capabilities	was	
proposed	by	Oslo	in	the	Core	Area	Initiative,	which	was	devised	
in	the	aftermath	of	the	Russian-Georgian	war32.	The	suggestions	
were	linked	to	specific	project	proposals	for	the	Norwegian	High	
North.	However,	Oslo’s	initiative	failed	to	secure	NATO’s	full	en-
dorsement,	which	is	why	Norway	has	been	trying	to	implement	
its	proposals	using	new	NATO	initiatives,	such	as	the	Smart	De-
fence	and	Connected	Forces	Initiative.	For	instance,	Oslo	has	pro-
posed	using	 a	pilot	project	 to	 increase	 the	 cooperation	between	
the	 Norwegian	 Joint	 Headquarters	 and	 NATO	 command	 struc-
tures	 in	 order	 to	 improve	NATO’s	 situational	 awareness	 in	 the	
31	 Sven	C.	Holtsmark,	‘Towards	cooperation	or	confrontation?	Security	in	the	
High	North’,	Research	Paper	No.	45,	NATO	Defense	College,	February	2009,	
p.	11,	http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1
32	 The	proposals	included	the	following:	the	introduction	of	regional	contin-
gency	planning	 and	 the	 return	 of	 responsibilities	 for	 regional	 defence	 to	
the	 Joint	Force	Commands	 (Brunssum	and	Naples);	 improvements	 to	geo-
graphical	expertise	and	situational	awareness	along	NATO	borders;	the	de-
velopment	of	closer	links	between	national	and	NATO	command	structures;	
and	 increased	NATO	 involvement	 in	 national	 and	multinational	military	
exercises.	 Espen	 Barth	 Eide,	 ‘Collective	 defence	 in	 today's	 security	 envi-
ronment’,	 16	 October	 2009,	 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/whats-
new/Speeches-and-articles/Speeches-and-articles-by-other-apolitica/
statssekretaer_espen_barth_eide/2009/collective-defence-in-todays-se-
curity-en.html?id=582015
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Arctic.	Norway	is	also	trying	to	involve	a	large	number	of	allies	
and	partners	in	its	national	Cold	Response	military	exercises	held	
in	the	High	North33,	and	is	seeking	to	host	NATO-led	exercises	in	
Norway	 (including	 the	 regularly	 held	Air	 Force	 exercise	NATO	
Tiger	Meet;	 in	2007,	 2012	and	2013	 these	drills	were	held	 in	 the	
Norwegian	High	North	under	the	name	Arctic	Tiger).	In	addition,	
Norway	has	proposed	using	the	large	and	low-populated	areas	in	
northern	Norway	for	large	NATO	air,	land	and	sea	military	exer-
cises	from	201434.	Norway’s	efforts	to	draw	the	allies’	attention	to	
the	High	North	can	be	best	illustrated	by	Oslo	inviting	the	NATO	
Secretary	General	and	the	members	of	the	North	Atlantic	Council	
to	northern	Norway	for	a	two-day	visit	in	May	201335.
it should be noted that	 oslo’s calls for greater emphasis on 
nato’s collective defence do not mean that norway plans to re-
frain from taking part in nato’s crisis-management missions 
or from the operations of the coalitions of the willing on the 
side of the united states or the european allies	 (see	Appendix	
2).	Norway	continues	to	see	its	involvement	in	overseas	missions	as	
a	way	to	consolidate	its	position	within	NATO	and	in	its	relations	
with	 the	 allies.	 nonetheless, its involvement in such opera-
tions has been increasingly contingent on the following fac-
tors:	the	effect	that	sending	Norwegian	troops	abroad	could	have	
on	the	country’s	ability	to	defend	its	own	territory;	the	visibility	of	
Nor	wegian	 involvement	 in	overseas	operations	and	the	resulting	
33	 The	exercises	are	open	to	invited	participants	in	the	Partnership	for	Peace	
programme,	and	so	far	have	been	held	in	2006,	2007,	2009,	2010	and	2012.	
In	 2012,	 the	 drills	were	 attended	 by	 fifteen	 countries	 and	 approximately	
16,000	soldiers.	Cold	Response	is	to	be	held	every	two	years.	Forsvaret,	Cold	
Response,	 21	 January	 2013,	http://forsvaret.no/aktuelt/ovelser/Sider/Cold-
Response.aspx	
34	 Norwegian	Ministry	of	Defence,	 ‘Ønsker	mer	NATO-øving	i	nord’,	27	Feb-
ruary	 2013,	 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/aktuelt/nyheter/2013/
onsker-mer-nato-oving-i-nord.html?id=715298
35	 Among	the	places	visited	by	the	delegates	were	the	Norwegian	Joint	Head-
quarters	 in	 Bodø,	 Nordland,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 capital	 of	 the	 Troms	 region,	
Tromsø.	NATO,	 ‘North	Atlantic	Council	wraps	up	visit	 to	Norway’,	 7	May	
2013,	http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_100335.htm	
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political	benefits;	and	the	presence	of	a	UN	Security	Council	man-
date	for	the	mission	in	question.	According	to	Norway,	any	illegiti-
mate	use	of	force	in	international	relations	undermines	the	princi-
ples	of	international	law;	and	setting	such	precedents	could	have	an	
indirect	impact	on	the	situation	in	the	High	North.	Consequently,	
Norway	did	take	part	in	the	military	operation	in	Libya,	which	was	
carried	 out	 in	 201136	 under	 a	UN	Security	Council	mandate	 –	 for	
which	it	was	praised	by	the	United	States	and	other	allies.	However	
in	2013,	Oslo	refused	to	become	involved	in	a	possible	military	in-
tervention	in	Syria	in	the	absence	of	a	UN	mandate	for	that	mission.	
Norway’s	active	involvement	in	NATO	is	paralleled	by	Oslo’s	policy 
of strengthening its bilateral relations with the united states.	
The	US	is	seen	as	the	country’s	most	important	NATO	ally	and	a	de 
facto guarantor of	Norway’s	national	security.	Consequently,	Oslo	
has	 been	 seeking	 to	 strengthen	Norwegian-American	 relations	
and	to	bolster	US	presence	in	Norway.	In	the	military	sphere,	the	
Norwegian	government	has	managed	to	maintain	a	constant	US	
presence	 by	 storing	 US	 military	 equipment	 under	 the	 Marine	
Corps	 Prepositioning	 Programme	Norway.	Of	 great	 importance	
for	Norway’s	defence	policy,	and	also	for	its	economy,	is	the	coun-
tries’	bilateral	cooperation	in	the	arms	industry.	Norway’s	orders	
for	American	military	equipment	and	armament	(most	recently,	
for	about	52	multi-role	F-35	fighters)	have	been	placed	in	exchange	
for	 assurances	 about	 the	 continued	 development	 of	 close	 links	
between	the	two	countries’	arms	industries37.	Oslo	is	also	keen	to	
36	 As	 part	 of	 the	 operation,	 six	 Norwegian	 F-16	 fighter	 aircraft	 carried	 out	
596	flights	between	March	and	August	2011,	which	accounted	for	10%	of	all	
flights	conducted	by	the	countries	taking	part	in	the	mission.	Norwegian	pi-
lots	logged	2000	flight	hours	and	dropped	542	bombs.	Gerard	O'Dwyer,	‘Nor-
way	withdraws	F-16s	from	Libya	Ops’,	DefenseNews,	 11	August	2011,	http://
www.defensenews.com/article/20110811/DEFSECT01/108110302/Norway-
Withdraws-F-16s-from-Libya-Ops
37	 Parts	of	the	manufacturing	process	for	the	F-35	fighter	aircraft	are	conduct-
ed	by	Lockheed	Martin,	in	collaboration	with	Norway’s	Kongsberg	and	AIM	
Norway,	among	others.	Kongsberg	has	also	won	orders	for	military	equip-
ment	and	armament	for	the	US	Navy	and	the	US	Army.
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ensure	that	American	troops	are	present	at	the	military	exercises	
held	in	the	High	North.	Finally,	to	some	extent	at	least,	Norway	
sees	its	own	involvement	in	NATO	operations	as	a	way	of	shoring	
up	its	bilateral	relations	with	the	United	States.
however, oslo’s goal of increasing the nato presence in the 
norwegian high north and of securing close relations with 
washington does have its limitations.	Norway	does	not	want	
to	provoke	Russia,	as	evidenced,	for	example,	by	the	lack	of	calls	
from	Norway	to	install	NATO	military	infrastructure	in	the	High	
North;	the	scenarios	and	the	areas	used	for	the	Cold	Response	ex-
ercises	involving	large	numbers	of	allies38;	and	the	rejection	of	the	
US	proposal	to	adapt	and	integrate	the	Norwegian	Fridtjof	Nans-
en-class	frigates	to	the	Aegis	BMD	system	under	the	NATO	missile	
defence	system.	In	a	similar	vein,	Jens	Stoltenberg’s	government	
(with	the	support	of	most	of	the	coalition	and	opposition	parties)	
openly	criticised	the	possibility	of	military	intervention	in	Syria	
without	a	UN	Security	Council	mandate,	and	argued	against	Nor-
way’s	involvement	in	the	operation39.	This	shows	that	even	in	its	
cooperation	with	the	US,	Norway	is	trying	to	keep	some	room	for	
manoeuvre	 in	 their	policies,	and	 in	making	decisions	about	 the	
scope	of	cooperation	in	the	region	and	the	country’s	involvement	
in	overseas	missions.	Furthermore,	it	appears	that	Norway	does	
not	want	NATO	to	become	too	politically	and	militarily	involved	
in	the	Arctic,	not	only	because	of	its	reluctance	to	provoke	Russia,	
but	also	to	prevent	NATO	member	states	outside	the	Arctic	region	
from	being	able	to	influence	political	processes	in	the	High	North,	
which	would	inevitably	weaken	Norway’s	standing	in	the	region.
38	 The	Cold	Response	exercises	have	so	 far	 followed	crisis	management	sce-
narios,	 and	 have	 not	 been	 held	 in	 the	 region	 bordering	 on	 Russia	 (Finn-
mark);	instead,	the	drills	were	conducted	in	Troms	and	Nordland.	NATO’s	
2011	CMX	exercise	held	in	Norway	was	based	on	Art.	5,	but	it	was	not	a	live	
exercise.	
39	 Espen	 Barth	 Eide,	 ‘Hodet	 på	 plass’,	Dagens Næringsliv,	 	 2	 September	 2013,	
http://www.regjeringen.no/mobil/nb/dep/ud/aktuelt/taler_artikler/eide_
taler/2013/svar_matlary.html?id=734852
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3. Building up norway’s own defence capabilities
The	second	pillar	of	Norway’s	defence	policy	calls	 for	 the	main-
tenance	and	expansion	of	the	country’s	own	defence	capabilities.	
The	importance	of	security	and	defence	issues	for	Norway	(com-
pared	with	other	NATO	countries)	can	be	gleaned	from	both	the	
level	of	spending	on	defence	and	from	the	efforts	to	‘anchor’	the	
Norwegian	Armed	Forces	in	society.	The	tasks,	structure,	activi-
ties,	military	equipment	and	armament,	as	well	as	the	geographi-
cal	location	of	military	infrastructure	in	Norway,	all	illustrate	the	
role	that	the	security	of	the	High	North	plays	in	determining	the	
development	 of	 the	Norwegian	Armed	 Forces.	 Despite	 the	 good	
reputation	enjoyed	by	the	military,	both	domestically	and	inter-
nationally,	 some	 areas	 of	 the	 modernisation	 and	 restructuring	
are	facing	difficulty.
since 2008, norway has been increasing its military spend-
ing	at	one	of the	highest	rates	since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	This	
stems	primarily	from	the	recognition	of	the	need	for	investment	
in	the	country’s	defence	capabilities,	but	it	has	also	been	greatly	
helped	by	a	healthy	state	budget.	Among	the	NATO	member	states,	
Norway	is	one	of	the	few	countries	planning	a	real	(i.e.	above	in-
flation)	increase	in	defence	spending	over	the	coming	years	(2013-
2016)40.	 Norway’s	military	 expenditure	 per	 capita	 is	 among	 the	
highest	among	NATO	member	states,	although	its	military	spend-
ing	as	percentage	of	GDP	remains	between	1.4%	and	1.6%	(i.e.	be-
low	the	2%	required	by	NATO).	Nominally,	Norway	also	has	the	
biggest	 defence	 budget	 among	 the	 Nordic	 countries:	 in	 recent	
years	 it	 overtook	Sweden	 in	 this	 respect,	 despite	Sweden’s	 sub-
stantially	 larger	population	and	a	higher	GDP	 (see	Appendix	3).	
norway is also one of few nato countries to retain compul-
sory military service, and is the only nato country to extend 
40	 Norwegian	 Ministry	 of	 Defence,	 ‘Norway	 releases	 New	 Defence	 Plan’,	
23	March	 2012,	http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/press-centre/Press-
releases/2012/norway-releases-new-defence-white-paper-.html?id=676237
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conscription also to women	(since	2013).	The	intentions	behind	
conscription	are	as	follows:	to	develop	an	understanding	and	ac-
ceptance	in	society	of	the	tasks	undertaken	by	the	Armed	Forces;	
to	increase	a	sense	of	collective	responsibility	for	maintaining	the	
security	and	sovereignty	of	the	state;	and	to	provide	the	best	op-
portunities	 for	 recruitment	 into	 the	 Norwegian	 Armed	 Forces.	
In	practice,	however,	the	Norwegian	military	service	is,	and	will	
remain,	largely	voluntary	–	due	to	the	relatively	small	number	of	
individuals	conscripted	in	any	given	year	(in	2012,	this	was	about	
8000	out	of	about	the	15,000	men	fit	for	service,	and	about	6000	
women;	see	Appendix	4)41.
the primary task of the norwegian armed forces	 is	 to	 act,	
both	 independently	and	 together	with	 its	 allies,	 to	protect	Nor-
wegian	 sovereignty,	national	 interests	 and	values,	 as	well	 as	 to	
enforce	the	country’s	laws	across	Norwegian	territory	and	all	ar-
eas	under	Norwegian	jurisdiction.	Taking	part	in	overseas	opera-
tions	is	regarded	as	secondary.	The	Norwegian	Armed	Forces	aim	
to	prevent	crises	and	conflicts,	and	seek	to	guarantee	security	and	
sovereign	 state	 action	 in	 the	 event	of	political	 or	military	pres-
sure42.	In	peacetime,	the	activities	of	the	Armed	Forces	focus	on	
the	monitoring	and	policing	of	the	Norwegian	land	territory,	air-
space	and	territorial	waters,	as	well	as	of	all	maritime	areas	under	
Norwegian	 jurisdiction	 (see	 Appendix	 5).	 They	 are	 responsible	
for	 customs,	 policing,	 environmental	 control	 and	 the	 monitor-
ing	of	fishing	activity	in	maritime	areas,	as	well	as	for	maritime	
and	 land	 search	 and	 rescue.	Other	 tasks	 include	 the	protection	
of	the	land	border	between	Norway	and	Russia,	the	protection	of	
41	 Forsvaret,	 	 ‘Tall	og	statistikk’,	http://forsvaret.no/om-forsvaret/fakta-om-
forsvaret/Sider/tall-og-statistikk.aspx.	From	2006	women	were	invited	to	
take	a	pre-service	medical	examination,	and	before	2013	they	could	volun-
teer	for	military	service.	
42	 Norwegian	 Ministry	 of	 Defence,	 ‘Et	 forsvar	 for	 vår	 tid.	 Proposisjon	 til	
Stortinget’,	Prop.	73	S,	p.	12-15,	23	March	2012,	http://www.regjeringen.no/
pages/37583840/PDFS/PRP201120120073000DDDPDFS.pdf
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military	and	civilian	infrastructure,	and	the	management	of	cri-
sis	situations	in	the	country.
the modernisation and restructuring of the norwegian 
armed forces has	 reflected	 these	priorities	 and	 tasks.	This	 re-
fers	particularly	to	the	Norwegian	High	North43,	where	Norway	
wants	 to	 maintain	 a	 constant	 and	 visible	 military	 presence	 at	
sea,	 in	the	air,	and	on	land.	To	address	the	challenge	of	protect-
ing	Norway’s	economic	interests	and	bolstering	its	capabilities	for	
crisis	response	across	large	maritime	areas,	the	modernisation	of	
the	Armed	Forces	focused	heavily	on	the	development	of	the	Nor-
wegian	navy and the coast guard	(a	branch	of	the	Navy),	both	
of	which	have	received	new	vessels	 in	recent	years44.	Currently,	
Norway	 is	 modernising	 and	 restructuring	 its	 air force:	 Nor-
way	has	decided	to	replace	its	multi-role	F-16	fighter	aircraft	with	
52	state-of-art	F-35	fighters	(armed	with	JSM	long-range,	stealth,	
anti-ship	and	land-attack	cruise	missiles),	which	are	expected	to	
enter	service	gradually	from	2018.	Norway	has	also	been	upgrad-
ing	its	helicopter	fleet	and	has	started	reforming	the	structure	of	
its	Air	Force.	In	addition,	it	has	launched	a	gradual	restructuring	
and	modernisation	programme	of	 its	relatively	neglected	army 
and home guard,	 aimed	 particularly	 at	 building	 up	 its	 capa-
bilities	for	operations	in	Arctic	conditions.	With	that	objective	in	
mind,	a	decision	has	been	taken	to	transform	one	of	the	existing	
battalions	in	the	Norwegian	High	North	into	an	‘Arctic	Battalion’	
which	will	be	better	suited	for	operations	in	polar	conditions	and	
43	 Justyna	Gotkowska,	Olaf	Osica	(eds.),	 ‘Closing	the	gap?	Military	co-opera-
tion	from	the	Baltic	Sea	to	the	Black	Sea’,	OSW	Report,	October	2012,	p.	38,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2012-12-10/closing-gap-
military-cooperation-baltic-sea-to-black-sea		
44	 The	Navy	 has	 received	 five	 Fridtjof	Nansen-class	 frigates	 and	 six	 Skjold-
class	patrol	boats,	referred	to	also	as	coastal	corvettes.	Both	types	of	vessels	
are	to	be	armed	with	Kongsberg’s	Naval	Strike	Missiles	(NSM).	The	Coast	
Guard	 has	 14	 vessels,	 including	 the	Nornen-class	 (5	 new	 units)	 and	 Bar-
entshav-class	(3	units)	patrol	vessels.	By	2016,	the	Coast	Guard	is	to	receive	
a	new	vessel	with	a	 reinforced	hull	 capable	of	 icebreaking,	 and	equipped	
with	a	helipad.
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will	be	composed	of	both	conscripts	and	permanent	personnel45.	
Moreover,	as	part	of	the	restructuring	programme,	Norway	has	
established	Cyber	Defence	as	a	new	branch	of	the	armed	forces,	
tasked	with	the	protection	of	both	military	(and	also	civilian,	in	
special	 cases)	 IT	 infrastructure	 and	of	 command	&	 control	 and	
communications	systems	against	potential	cyber-attacks.
The	 significance	 of	 the	Norwegian	High	North	 is	 also	 reflected	
in	the	geographical location in this region of military infra-
structure across norway,	 although	 this	 has	 also	 partly	 been	
shaped	by	 the	 legacy	 of	 the	Cold	War	 era.	 In	 this	 context,	Nor-
way’s	northern	regions	include	Nordland,	Troms	and	Finnmark.	
For	financial	and	operational	reasons,	the	military	infrastructure	
has	been	reduced	and	concentrated	in	recent	years.	In	2009	Nor-
wegian	Joint	Headquarters	(NJHQ),	which	is	responsible	for	lead-
ing,	planning,	and	conducting	operations	both	in	the	country	and	
abroad,	was	moved	from	southern	Norway	to	the	northern	town	
of	 Bodø	 (Nordland	 region).	 In	 line	with	 the	 Long-Term	Defence	
Plan	2013-2016,	 one	of	Norway’s	 two	main	air	bases	 (in	Bodø)	 is	
to	be	closed	down	for	 infrastructural	and	political	reasons,	and	
the	country’s	main	air	station	is	to	be	located	in	Ørland,	in	cen-
tral	Norway	(Sør-Trøndelag	region).	The	Ørland	Main	Air	Station	
is	to	house	the	recently	ordered	multi-role	F-35	fighter	aircraft	as	
well	as	other	Air	Force	units.	However,	the	Quick	Reaction	Alert	
detachment	is	to	be	stationed	at	Evenes	(Nordland	region)	in	or-
der	 to	maintain	 a	 fast	 response	 time	 in	 the	 High	 North.	 Bases	
in	northern	Norway	also	house	the	country’s	only	fleet	of	patrol	
and	 reconnaissance	 P-3	 Orion	 aircraft	 (Nordland	 region),	 and	
its	largest	helicopter	fleet	(Troms	region).	The	northern	bases	of	
the	Norwegian	Navy,	which	is	concentrated	in	the	southern	city	
of	Bergen,	include	the	Coastal	Ranger	Command	(Kystjegerkom-
mandoen)	 in	 Troms	 region;	 the	 Naval	 Special	 Operations	 Unit	
45	 Trude	 Pettersen,	 ‘Norway	 establishes	 Arctic	 Battalion’,	 BarentsObserver,	
29	March	2012,	http://barentsobserver.com/en/topics/norway-establishes-
arctic-battalion	
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(Marinejegerkommandoen)	 in	 Nordland	 region;	 and	 the	 head-
quarters	of	the	Norwegian	Coast	Guard	in	Sortland,	Nordland	re-
gion.	In	addition,	northern	Norway	also	houses	the	Brigade	Nord	
headquarters	(the	only	brigade	in	the	Norwegian	Army)	as	well	
as	the	following	Brigade	Nord	battalions:	the	motorised	infantry	
battalion;	the	artillery	battalion;	the	battlefield	surveillance,	in-
telligence	 gathering	&	 electronic	warfare	 battalion;	 the	 combat	
engineer	battalion,	the	armoured	battalion;	the	signal	battalion;	
the	 logistics	 battalion,	 and	 the	medical	 battalion	 (in	 Troms	 re-
gion).	Furthermore,	the	town	of	Kirkenes	on	the	Norwegian-Rus-
sian	border	(Finnmark	region)	houses	the	border	guard	battalion.
Although	 Norwegian	 management	 of	 the	 financing,	 recruit-
ment,	operation,	restructuring	and	modernisation	of	the	Armed	
Forces	 is	well	 designed,	 there are deficiencies in some areas, 
which	have	been	subject	to	public	debate	in	Norway	since	spring	
201346.	The	current	problems	are	mainly	the	result	of	inadequate	
financing	regarding	the	needs	and	difficulties	in	recruiting	per-
sonnel.	The	public	discussion	has	highlighted	 the	 limitations	of	
the	 current	 conscription	model	 for	 the	operational	 readiness	of	
the	 Norwegian	 Armed	 Forces47.	 The	 country’s	 military	 consist	
of	 16,000	 military	 and	 civilian	 personnel	 and	 approximately	
8000	conscripts	(see	Appendix	4).	Conscripts	only	supplement	the	
professional	Navy	and	Air	Force	personnel,	and	serve	mainly	in	
the	Army.	Consequently,	the	level	of	operational	readiness	of	the	
battalions	composed	of	conscripts	–	who	form	the	core	of	the	land	
troops	in	the	High	North	–	is	quite	low.	The	battalions	composed	of	
professional	soldiers	(Telemark,	special	forces	units),	which	have	
also	taken	part	in	overseas	operations,	are	stationed	in	the	south	
46	 The	debate	was	triggered	by	the	publication	of	a	report	on	the	status	of	the	
Norwegian	Armed	Forces	by	the	former	director	of	the	Norwegian	Defence	
Research	 Institute	 (FFI),	Nils	Holme.	See	Nils	Holme,	 ‘Forsvarspolitikken	
ved	et	veiskille’,	Civita-Rapport,	April	2013,	http://www.civita.no/publikas-
jon/forsvarspolitikken-ved-et-veiskille
47	 Gerard	 O’Dwyer,	 ‘Norway's	 Former	 Defense	 Chief	 Blasts	 'Dysfunctional'	
Conscript-based	Military’,	30	September	2013,	DefenseNews,	http://www.de-
fensenews.com/article/20130930/DEFREG01/309300031	
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of	the	country.	However,	staffing	is	also	a	big	problem	for	the	mod-
ernised	 Navy;	 despite	 receiving	 five	 new	 Fridtjof	 Nansen-class	
frigates,	the	Navy	currently	has	only	three	sets	of	crew	to	operate	
them.	The	Air	Force	is	facing	similar	problems:	of	its	57	multi-role	
F-16	fighter	aircraft,	only	15-16	aircraft	could	be	used	in	2010	due	
to	technical	problems.	Norway	also	lacks	the	necessary	resources	
for	 adequate	 equipment	 and	 training	 of	 its	Home	Guard.	Other	
criticisms	refer	to	Norway’s	reluctance	to	carry	out	military	ex-
ercise	in	areas	close	to	the	Russian	border	(northern	Troms	and	
Finnmark)	–	that	is,	in	those	parts	of	the	country	where	crisis	sit-
uations	are	the	most	likely48.	Furthermore,	although	the	govern-
ment	has	announced	plans	to	increase	Norway’s	defence	budget,	
the	very	costly	purchase	of	52	multi-role	F-35s	may	mean	that	over	
the	next	few	years	other	planned	purchases	may	be	suspended,	or	
that	the	number	of	military	exercises	could	be	reduced,	thereby	
lowering	 the	 operational	 capabilities	 of	 the	 Norwegian	 Armed	
Forces	as	a	whole.
4. cooperation across northern europe
In	addition	to	the	measures	proposed	within	NATO,	and	the	steps	
taken	to	boost	Norway’s	own	military	capabilities,	Oslo’s	defence	
policy	also	calls	for	greater	cooperation	on	security	and	defence	
across	Northern	Europe,	 both	with	 other	NATO	member	 states	
as	 well	 as	 with	 Sweden	 and	 Finland.	 Norway	 has	 been	 one	 of	
the	main	 advocates	 of	 intensifying	Nordic	 defence	 cooperation;	
it	has	developed	a	 strategy	of	 cooperation	between	other	North	
Sea	countries,	and	has	supported	the	idea	of		political	and	military	
cooperation	 within	 the	 Northern	 Group.	 Through	 these	 initia-
tives,	Oslo	hopes	 to	boost	defence	capabilities	both	at	home	and	
across	the	region,	 in	response	to	the	changing	security	context.	
The	 changes	 relate	 to	 the	modernisation	 and	 reform	of	Russia’s	
48	 Sveinung	Berg	Bentzrød,	‘Vi	aner	ikke	hva	Forsvaret	kan	klare’,	Aftenposten,	
3	May	2013,	http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/--Vi-aner-ikke-hva-
Forsvaret-kan-klare-7188615.html#.UgOZ9dj-QyI
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military	 capabilities	 against	 the	background	of	 increasing	 stra-
tegic	importance	of	the	High	North,	on	the	one	hand;	and	to	the	
uncertainty	about	the	future	development	and	political	cohesion	
of	NATO,	 and	 about	 the	 degree	 of	Washington’s	 involvement	 in	
Europe	on	the	other.	in norway’s view, political and military 
cooperation between the nordic countries and with major 
european allies has a deterrent effect against russia. its aim 
is to raise interoperability, to build closer military ties, and 
to increase the presence of norway’s partners and allies in 
the country.
norway’s involvement in the nordic defence cooperation 
(nordefco) initiative49,	 alongside	 Sweden,	 Finland	 and	 Den-
mark,	 aims	 to	 strengthen	 the	defence	 capabilities	 of	 the	 region	
through	joint	military	exercises	and	training,	as	well	as	the	joint	
procurement	of	armament	and	military	equipment.	Working	to-
gether,	 the	Nordic	 countries	 are	 able	 to	 achieve	more,	 and	 any	
savings	generated	through	collaboration	can	be	spent	in	other	ar-
eas.	 In	addition,	 for	Sweden	and	Finland,	which	remain	outside	
NATO,	sustained	cooperation	with	Denmark	and	Norway	enables	
them	to	adopt	NATO	standards	more	efficiently.	It	increases	inter-
operability	not	only	between	the	Nordic	countries,	but	also	with	
NATO	–	both	within	the	region	and	beyond	 it.	However,	Nordic	
cooperation	should	not	restrict	Norway’s	sovereignty	in	political	
decision-making,	nor	is	it	seen	as	a	potential	alternative	to	NATO	
in	the	region.	Norway	treats	NORDEFCO	as	a	useful	format	for	the	
implementation	 of	 Nordic	 projects,	 such	 as	 ‘pooling	 &	 sharing’	
and	‘smart	defence’;	and	in	the	event	of	joint	military	involvement	
overseas.	The	initiative	is	used	as	a	branding	exercise	for	the	re-
gion	in	the	UN,	NATO	and	the	EU.	Although	NORDEFCO	has	been	
at	the	core	of	Norway’s	military	cooperation,	due	to	the	relatively	
small	defence	capabilities	of	 the	Nordic	countries,	Norway	does	
49	 See	Justyna	Gotkowska,	‘Smart	Defense	Nordic	Style’,	CEWEEKLY,	19	Sep-
tember	2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2012-09-19/
smart-defence-nordic-style
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not	want	to	limit	this	type	of	international	co-operation	solely	to	
links	with	its	immediate	neighbours.	Oslo	prefers	cooperation	in-
volving	major	NATO	allies	in	case	it	offers	greater	political,	mili-
tary	or	economic	benefits.
norway’s military cooperation with the north sea countries	
is	seen	in	exactly	these	terms.	The	very	presence	of	these	countries	
in	the	Norwegian	High	North,	as	well	as	military-technical,	and	
even	economic	cooperation	with	the united Kingdom, germany 
and the netherlands,	bolsters	Norway’s	standing	in	its	relations	
with	Russia.	All	of	these	states	are	NATO	members	with	the	big-
gest	military	capabilities	in	the	region;	and	in	addition,	they	are	
also	 major	 importers	 of	 Norwegian	 oil	 and	 gas50.	 The	 strategic	
nature	of	cooperation	with	these	countries	has	been	emphasised	
in	the	Norwegian	North	Sea	Strategy	initiated	by	the	Ministry	of	
Defence	 in	2003/2004.	So	far,	Norway	has	developed	the	closest	
links	with	 the	UK,	as	 exemplified	by	an	agreement	on	bilateral	
defence	cooperation	signed	in	March	201251.	The	outcomes	of	this	
agreement	have	 included	Royal	Marines	 commando	 training	 in	
the	Norwegian	High	North52.	Meanwhile,	 in	April	2013,	Norway	
signed	 an	 agreement	 on	military	 cooperation	with	 the	Nether-
lands;	 this	 document	 envisages	 joint	 training	 programmes	 and	
cooperation	between	individual	branches	of	the	countries’	armed	
forces	 as	 well	 as	 between	 their	 defence	 industries53.	 In	 the	 fu-
ture,	Germany	is	likely	to	become	an	equally	important	partner	
50	 In	2010,	the	United	Kingdom	imported	52%	of	Norwegian	oil,	followed	by	the	
Netherlands	–with	18%,	and	Germany	–with	5%.	In	the	same	year,	Germany	
purchased	30%,	UK	27%,	and	 the	Netherlands	8%	of	 the	Norwegian	natu-
ral	gas	transported	via	pipelines.	US	Energy	Information	Administration,	
‘Norway’,	http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NO
51	 Norwegian	Ministry	of	Defence,	 ‘Skrev	under	 samarbeidsavtale	med	Stor-
britannia’,	7	March	2012,	http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/whats-new/
News/2012/skrev-under-samarbeidsavtale-med-storbri.html?id=674220
52	 British	Ministry	of	Defence,	‘Defence	Secretary	visits	Royal	Marines	com-
mandos	in	Norway’,	2	March	2013,	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
defence-secretary-visits-royal-marine-commandos-in-norway
53	 Altair	Aviation	Agency,	 ‘Norwegian-Dutch	cooperation	agreement’,	3	 June	
2013,	http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=10585&q=Skjold
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for	Norway,	mainly	due	 to	Germany’s	 increasing	 importance	 in	
the	European	Union,	and	Germany’s	good	relations	with	Russia.	
Germany’s	economic	and/or	military	presence	in	the	Norwegian	
High	North	would	thus	have	a	stabilising	effect	on	the	entire	re-
gion.	 Currently,	 the	military	 cooperation	 between	Norway	 and	
Germany	has	been	limited	to	links	between	the	Brigade	Nord	and	
the	I.	German-Dutch	Corps.	Every	few	years,	German	and	Dutch	
ground	troops	conduct	joint	military	exercises	in	Norway54.	The	
involvement	of	German	companies	in	the	Norwegian	petroleum	
sector,	 including	 the	 extraction	 of	 deposits	 on	 the	 Norwegian	
continental	shelf	in	an	area	close	to	the	Russian	border,	has	been	
equally	important	for	Norway55.
Furthermore,	Norway	has	been	highlighting	the	need	to	explore	
the	possibility	of	political and military cooperation and dia-
logue across northern europe within the framework of the 
northern group,	which	includes	the	Nordic	and	Baltic	countries,	
the	UK,	 the	Netherlands,	 Germany	 and	 Poland56.	 The	Northern	
Group	 format	 merges	 all	 existing	 formats	 of	 military	 coopera-
tion	led	by	Norway:	the	Nordic	format,	the	Nordic-Baltic	format,	
as	 well	 as	 the	 North	 Sea	 Strategy,	 with	 Poland’s	 participation.	
It	also	gives	Sweden	and	Finland	the	opportunity	 to	participate	
in	talks	held	by	NATO	member	states	about	regional	challenges	
and	 threats.	Norway	 treats	 the	Northern	Group	 as	 a	 forum	 for	
strengthening	existing	collaboration	and	exploring	new	forms	of	
working	together.	However,	the	practical	dimension	of	this	coop-
eration	remains	to	be	seen.
54	 Such	as	the	Cold	Challenge	2011	drills,	or	the	planed	Noble	Ledger	2014	ex-
ercise.	
55	 Trude	Pettersen,	‘Norway	and	Germany	talk	energy’,	BarentsObserver,	20	Feb	-	
ruary	 2013,	 http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2013/02/norway-and-ger-
many-talk-energy-20-02	
56	 This	format	was	initiated	by	the	United	Kingdom.	The	Group’s	first	meeting	
was	held	in	Oslo	in	2010	at	the	level	of	defence	ministers	and	secretaries	of	
state.
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iii. norway and the Baltic sea region
for a number of reasons, norway would seem to be a natu-
ral partner for poland and other countries in the Baltic sea 
region seeking closer cooperation on the bilateral, regional, 
and nato levels. Although	Norway	does	not	see	itself	as	a	mem-
ber	of	the	Baltic	Sea	region,	as	a	result	of	its	intense	political	and	
military	 cooperation	 with	 Sweden	 and	 Finland,	 Oslo	 does	 pay	
close	attention	to	changes	in	regional	security	environment.	Just	
like	 the	states	 in	 the	Baltic	Sea	region,	Norway	also	sees	Russia	
as	a	country	with	an	unstable	domestic	policy,	an	unpredictable	
foreign	policy,	and	as	a	state	harbouring	imperial	ambitions	and	
having	sufficient	means	(and	military	capabilities)	to	try	to	real-
ise	these	ambitions,	at	least	in	its	immediate	neighbourhood.	Like	
Poland	 and	 the	 Baltic	 states,	Oslo	 is	 in	 favour	 of	 strengthening	
NATO’s	collective	defence,	but	at	the	same	time	has	been	increas-
ingly	emphasising	the	need	for	a	regional	dimension	of	military	
cooperation.
despite sharing similar interests, norway has been rather 
cautious in its approach to cooperation with allies from the 
Baltic sea region with regard to nato’s collective defence.	
This	has	been	the	case	for	two	reasons.	First,	Norway	sees	Poland	
and	the	Baltic	states	as	competitors	in	its	efforts	to	attract	the	al-
lies’	 attention,	win	 security	 guarantees,	 and	 ensure	 their	mili-
tary	presence	in	the	Norwegian	High	North.	These	concerns	seem	
particularly	relevant	at	a	time	when	the	defence	budgets	of	NATO	
member	states	are	being	cut	and	the	US	is	redirecting	its	attention	
and	military	resources	to	the	Asia-Pacific	region57.	Second,	Nor-
way	is	concerned	that	the	growing	tensions	between	NATO	and	
Russia	in	the	Baltic	Sea	region	or	in	Central	Europe	may	have	a	det-
rimental	 effect	 on	 Norwegian-Russian	 relations.	 Consequently,	
57	 Norwegian	 Ministry	 of	 Defence,	 ‘Et	 forsvar	 for	 vår	 tid.	 Proposisjon	 til	
Stortinget’,	 Prop.	 73	 S,	 p.	 25,	 23	March	 2012,	 http://www.regjeringen.no/
pages/37583840/PDFS/PRP201120120073000DDDPDFS.pdf
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Norway’s	 military	 or	 political	 involvement	 in	 NATO	 activities	
in	 these	 regions	–	which	Russia	 sees	as	hostile	 –	 could	have	 re-
percussions	 for	 the	 High	 North.	 Oslo’s	 concerns	might	 explain	
the	country’s	 small	presence	 (limited	 largely	 to	 staff	officers)	at	
NATO’s	Steadfast	Jazz	2013	exercise	hosted	by	Poland	and	the	Bal-
tic	states.	Steadfast	Jazz	2013	was	a	field	training	exercise	based	
on	Article	5	of	the	Washington	Treaty	(i.e.	practising	a	response	
to	an	armed	attack	on	NATO	territory).	At	the	political	level,	the	
position	of	the	Norwegian	government	became	particularly	clear	
during	 the	 Russian-Georgian	war	 in	 2008.	Norway	 blamed	 the	
outbreak	of	the	hostilities	on	Georgia,	although	it	also	argued	that	
Russia	acted	in	violation	of	international	law.	During	the	conflict,	
Norway	 was	 among	 the	 group	 of	 countries	 which	 unofficially	
claimed	that	Russia's	actions	had	been	provoked,	amongst	other	
things,	by	the	declaration	adopted	at	the	NATO	summit	in	Bucha-
rest;	the	document	officially	announced	NATO’s	open	door	policy	
for	Georgia’s	and	Ukraine’s	future	accession,	and	was	passed	with	
strong	support	from	the	US	and	several	Central	European	coun-
tries.	Throughout	the	conflict,	Norway	called	for	dialogue	and	co-
operation	with	Russia	within	the	framework	of	the	NATO-Russia	
Council58.
despite norway’s distanced position, the countries in Baltic 
sea region can still find areas for cooperation based on similar 
interests within nato – although the principle of reciprocity 
ought to be a key element when dealing with oslo.	Norway’s	
calls	 for	 the	 refocusing	on	NATO’s	 collective	defence	deserve	 to	
be	supported.	The	implementation	of	specific	projects	should	take	
place	not	only	in	the	High	North,	but	also	on	NATO’s	eastern	pe-
riphery.	 In	 order	 to	 improve	 the	 interoperability	 of	 the	 armed	
forces	across	Northern	Europe,	it	is	of	interest	to	other	countries	
to	 take	 part	 in	 Norway's	 national	 military	 exercises	 (e.g.	 Cold	
58	 ‘Norway	 among	 those	 splitting	 NATO’,	 Views and News from Norway,	
14	February	2012,	http://www.newsinenglish.no/2011/02/14/norway-among-
those-splitting-nato/
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
1/
20
14
41
Response).	However,	 this	 should	 be	 done	with	 the	 proviso	 that	
Norwegian	military	 increases	 its	presence	at	national	exercises	
held	in	Poland	and	in	the	Baltic	Sea	region.	Norway’s	conservative	
government	may	prove	more	open	to	the	idea	of	joint	NATO	exer-
cises	and	to	closer	cooperation	with	countries	in	the	region.	The	
new	cabinet	might	perhaps	be	more	inclined	to	accept	the	argu-
ment	that	any	actions	undermining	NATO’s	security	guarantees,	
or	allowing	Russia	to	exert	military	pressure	on	any	NATO	mem-
ber	 in	 the	Baltic	Sea	region	or	Central	Europe,	would	automati-
cally	also	undermine	NATO’s	credibility	in	the	High	North.
in recent years, the bilateral dimension of relations between 
norway and poland has created greater opportunities for co-
operation. the most promising of these have been the prag-
matic military-technical collaboration, which may benefit 
the armed forces and the defence industries of both countries, 
but which has not a distinctive political character and will 
not cause controversy in norway’s relations with russia.	 In	
its	security	strategy	adopted	in	2012,	Norway	mentioned	Poland	
for	the	first	time	as	a	potential	partner	for	such	cooperation59.	The	
rise	 in	the	significance	Poland	has	for	Norway	is	a	consequence	
of	the	planned	modernisation	of	the	Polish	Armed	Forces	enabled	
by	 a	 rise	 in	military	 spending.	 In	 addition,	Poland	has	 recently	
purchased	 Norwegian	 armament	 and	 military	 equipment.	 For	
example,	 the	acquisition	of	 the	coastal	artillery	system	equiped	
with	Naval	Strike	Missiles	(acquired	by	the	Polish	Navy	from	the	
Norwegian	company	Kongsberg	Defence	Systems	in	cooperation	
with	several	Polish	companies)	offers	opportunities	for	exchange	
59	 Norwegian	 Ministry	 of	 Defence,	 ‘Et	 forsvar	 for	 vår	 tid.	 Proposisjon	 til	
Stortinget”,	 Prop.	 73	 S,	 p	 28,	 23	March	 2012,	 http://www.regjeringen.no/
pages/37583840/PDFS/PRP201120120073000DDDPDFS.pdf.	 This	 was	 fur-
ther	 emphasised	 during	 an	 unprecedented	 visit	 to	 Poland	 made	 in	 2012	
by	Norway’s	royal	couple,	the	Defence	Minister	and	the	Foreign	Minister.	
The	 agenda	 contained	 an	 important	 point	 on	military-technical	 coopera-
tion.	 National	 Security	 Bureau,	 ‘Norwegian	 Royal	 Couple	 visits	 Poland’,	
http://en.bbn.gov.pl/en/news/247,Norwegian-royal-couple-visits-Poland.
html?search=7634118
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of	experience	and	joint	exercises	with	the	Norwegian	Navy	(the	
NSM	are	to	be	carried	by	Norwegian	frigates	and	corvettes	also)60.	
Norway	is	also	interested	in	Poland	as	a	potential	partner	in	col-
laboration	between	 the	special	 forces61.	Norway	 is	currently	re-
structuring	its	Special	Operations	Forces	(SOF)62,	while	Poland’s	
SOF	already	constitute	a	separate	branch	of	the	armed	forces	and	
are	 the	 country’s	 strongest	 asset	 in	NATO.	 In	 exchange,	 Poland	
could	 benefit	 from	 Norwegian	 SOF’s	 experience	 in	 protecting	
critical	infrastructure	(such	as	energy	infrastructure,	especially	
sea-based	 and	 coastal	 infrastructure).	 Meanwhile,	 cooperation	
between	the	countries’	air	forces	could	focus	on	the	operation	of	
the	multi-role	F-16	fighter	and	of	the	C-130	military	transport	air-
craft,	which	(in	various	versions)	are	used	by	both	the	Polish	and	
Norwegian	Armed	Forces.	Finally,	Poland	might	also	be	interested	
in	learning	more	about	Oslo’s	policy	on	Russia	and	about	its	expe-
rience	of	engaging	in	military	cooperation	with	Moscow.
This research paper was completed in October 2013. 
60	 In	the	past,	cooperation	between	the	two	countries’	navies	focused	on	Po-
land’s	acquisition	in	2002	of	five	Kobben-class	submarines	withdrawn	from	
service	by	the	Norwegian	Navy.	Four	of	the	vessels	are	still	in	operation.
61	 Poland’s	Ministry	 of	 Defence,	 ‘Meeting	 of	 Polish	 and	 Norwegian	 Special	
Forces	 Commanders’,	 23	 February	 2013,	 http://www.mon.gov.pl/en/ar-
tykul/12484	
62	 Gerard	O'Dwyer,	 ‘Norway	 revamps	Special	Operations	Capacity’,	Defense­
News,	11	May	2013,	http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130511/SHOWS-
COUT01/305110011/Norway-Revamps-Special-Operations-Capacity.	In	Nor-
way,	Special	Forces	do	not	constitute	a	separate	branch	of	the	armed	forces;	
separate	 units	 are	 subordinated	 to	 the	 Navy	 (Marinejegerkommandoen)	
and	the	Army	(Forsvarets	Spesialkommando	/	Hærens	Jegerkommando).
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appendix 1. norwegian Maritime Boundaries
Norwegian	High	North:	the	Norwegian	Territorial	Sea	and	parts	
of	Norway’s	northern	regions	(Nordland,	Troms	and	Finnmark);	
Norway’s	200-mile	Exclusive	Economic	Zone	 in	 the	Barents	Sea	
and	the	North	Sea,	as	well	as	claims	to	the	continental	shelf	be-
yond	the	200	nautical-mile	 limit	 in	selected	areas	of	 the	Arctic;	
the	Svalbard	Archipelago	and	the	Island	of	Jan	Mayen.
/
©
source: http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/20121002_
FMGT_OVERVIEW_NORGE_NORDOMRaaDENE_NORWEGIAN_MARITIME_
BOUNDARIES_7.5M_H61xW52_P_JB_ED04_UGRADERT_300dpi.pdf
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appendix 2. norway’s participation in international 
operations63
operation / no. of troops 
/ year 2009 2010 2011 2012
Afghanistan
-	UNAMA	(ONZ)
-	ISAF	(NATO)
2
510
2
526
1
535
3
628
Kosovo
-	UNMIK	(ONZ)
-	KFOR	(NATO)
1
6
1
4
1
3
1
3
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina
-	EUFOR
-	NATO	HQ
21
3 2 1 1
Sudan
-	UNMIS/UNISFA	(ONZ) 22 20 11 19
Congo
-	MONUC/MONUSCO	(ONZ) 1 1 1 1
Chad
-	MINURCAT	(NATO) 154
Horn	of	Africa
-	Atalanta	(UE)
-	Ocean	Shield	(NATO)
4 39 39
Middle	East
-	UNSTO	(ONZ) 13 14 12 13
Sinai	Peninsula	
-	MFO	(ONZ) 6 3 3 3
63	 Source:	Norwegian	Ministry	of	Defence,	‘Facts	and	Figures.	Norwegian	De-
fence’	from	the	years	2010-2013,	http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/docu-
ments/Handbooks-and-brochures.html?id=2126	 as	 well	 as	 Forsvaret,	 Ope-
rasjoner	 i	 utlandet,	 http://forsvaret.no/operasjoner/internasjonalt/Sider/
default.aspx	
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operation / no. of troops 
/ year 2009 2010 2011 2012
Lebanon
-	UNIFIL	II	(ONZ) 5
Libya
-	OUP	(NATO) 108
Total
avg.	of	ap-
prox.	800	
troops
avg.	of	ap-
prox.	700	
troops
avg.	of	ap-
prox.	650	
troops
avg.	of	ap-
prox.	700	
troops
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appendix 3. Military expenditure
Military expenditure in Norway and Sweden between  
1989-2012 (in US$ billion)
4
6
8
10
source:	SIPRI	Military	Expenditure	Database,	Stockholm	International	Peace	
Research	Institute,	figures	from	2012	in	US$,	http://www.sipri.org/research/
armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database
Military expenditure between 1989-2012 (as a percentage of GDP)
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
source:	SIPRI	Military	Expenditure	Database,	Stockholm	International	Peace	
Research	Institute,	http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/mi-
lex_database/milex_database
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appendix 4. norwegian armed forces: personnel strength 
and categories 
Strength of the Norwegian Armed Forces (2012)64 – military 
personnel, civilians and conscripts
Norwegian	Army
4550	
+	4802	conscripts
Royal	Norwegian	Navy
2426	
+	2277	conscripts*
Royal	Norwegian	Air	Force
2811	
+	1158	conscripts
Logistics 2813
Home	Guard
534	
+	54	conscripts
Cyber	Defence 1089
Other 2778
total strength: 
16,991 civilian and military personnel 
8000 conscripts
+	approx.	45,000	reserve	personnel
*	including	Coast	Guard	360	(+339	conscripts)
64	 Forsvaret,	Forsvarets	årsrapport	2012,	22	March	2013,	http://forsvaret.no/
om-forsvaret/fakta-om-forsvaret/publikasjoner/rapport2012/Documents/
Forsvarets%20%C3%A5rsrapport%202012%20fullstendig%20versjon.pdf
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
1/
20
14
48
Personnel categories in the Norwegian Armed Forces (2012)65
Military personnel 
-	permanent	personnel	(Y­befal)
-	under	contract	up	to	age	35	(A­befal)	
-	under	temporary	contracts	of	up	to	3	years	(Vervede)
6754
3655
1241
conscripts (mandatory	draft)
19­month compulsory military service with 12­month initial 
service, and 5 months allocated to the revision training or 
training with the Home Guard
approx.	
8000
civilian personnel approx.	5300
65	 Forsvaret,	Forsvarets	årsrapport	2012,	22	March	2013,	http://forsvaret.no/
om-forsvaret/fakta-om-forsvaret/publikasjoner/rapport2012/Documents/
Forsvarets%20%C3%A5rsrapport%202012%20fullstendig%20versjon.pdf
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appendix 5. norwegian armed forces: domestic activity
Norwegian Air Force – Air Policing Activity66
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
No.	of	flights 32 38 36 34 41
No.	of	identified	aircraft* 87 77 39 48 71
*	No	distinction	is	made	between	those	identified	aircraft	which	only	approached	
Norway’s	airspace	and	those	which	actually	crossed	it.	The	identified	aircraft	
were	mostly	Russian	military	craft.			
Norwegian Coast Guard – Number of Patrol Days  
in Northern and Southern Norway67
2010 2011 2012
Northern	Norway 2112 2226 2137
Southern	Norway 1375 1373 1469
66	 Quick	 Reaction	 Alert	 of	 the	multi-role	 F-16	 aircraft.	 ‘Forsvaret,	 Kampfly:	
klare	 på	 15	minutter’,	 http://forsvaret.no/operasjoner/norge/Sider/Kamp-
fly.aspx
67	 Forsvaret,	Forsvarets	årsrapport	2012,	22	March	2013,	http://forsvaret.no/
om-forsvaret/fakta-om-forsvaret/publikasjoner/rapport2012/Documents/
Forsvarets%20%C3%A5rsrapport%202012%20fullstendig%20versjon.pdf
